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ABSTRACT 
Two Pakistani rural development projects were analyzed 
using an interdisciplinary technique. One project was con­
ducted in the Punjab region of what formerly was West Pakistan 
(now Pakistan) under the auspices of the Colony Cooperative 
Farming Unions, Khanewal. The second project was conducted 
in the Comilla thana of what formerly was East Pakistan (now 
Bangladesh) under the auspices of the Pakistan Academy for 
Rural Development, Comilla. In addition to their being rural 
and in the same nation (Pakistan), both projects were under­
taken in the early 1960*s, were government sponsored, involved 
cooperative systems, included American Peace Corps Volunteers, 
and included a tractor driver training element, 
A case study was developed on each of the selected rural 
development projects. An interdisciplinary technique was 
formulated to analyze the specific data within the case 
studies. This technique consisted of applying a series of 39 
questions regarding the design, organization, and functions of 
the selected rural development projects. The questions were 
adapted from the works of D. Bordenave and P. Hill. The 39 
questions were clustered into seven categories--cultural, 
economic, educational, political, psychological, sociological, 
and technical. 
The findings and conclusions of the study were directly 
related to the three propositions put forth in the study. The 
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analysis of the Comilla project was used to verify the first 
proposition regarding a successful development project. It 
was concluded that a sufficient number of interdisciplinary 
dimensions were taken into account during the planning and 
implementation of the Comilla project. The analysis of the 
Khanewal project was used to verify the second proposition 
regarding an unsuccessful development project. It was con­
cluded that the failure to take into account the relevant 
interdisciplinary dimensions of a development project, during 
its planning and implementation stages, decreased the chances 
for successfully integrating innovative practices into the 
target society. Bordenave's set of interdisciplinary ques­
tions was used to verify the study's third proposition re­
garding the proper accounting of a development project. It 
was concluded that an interdisciplinary methodology can pro­
vide a proper accounting of the many dimensions of a develop­
ment project. 
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CHAPTER I. INTRODUCTION 
He who only knows his own subject 
does not know that either. 
S. R. Steinmetz 
The period of decolonization that began at the conclusion 
of the Second World War, although somewhat abated, has contin­
ued to the present time. The end of the British Raj in India 
and the resultant formation of the free and independent coun­
tries of Pakistan and India in 1947 signaled the beginning of 
a new world order. Colonialism, imperialism, and exploitation 
of long-conquered lands were no longer to be tolerated. Free­
dom and independence of all nations, and for all peoples, were 
the new goals set by the world's most influential leaders. 
One after another, former colonies won or were given their in­
dependence—Nigeria, Malawi, Tanzania, Kenya, Egypt, Algeria, 
Singapore, Indonesia, Malaysia, Guyana, and Surinam. 
But the transition from a protected colony to a free and 
independent nation was not always an easy matter. Problems 
quickly developed in many of the new countries. Many of these 
problems were directly related to a country having been a 
colony. For example, exploitation of resources left many 
nations without an economic foundation from which to function; 
the lack of a trained and educated indigenous cadre to replace 
the expatriate personnel in key political positions often led 
to chaos, revolt, and revolution; and this same lack of 
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replacement personnel in the technical areas often led to re­
gression in the industrial, agricultural, and service sectors, 
which also added to the economic problems. 
Virtually all of these former colonies, as well as many 
other nonprogressing countries throughout the world, needed 
massive support from the wealthier, more developed nations if 
they were to survive. The only question was, what type of 
support should be given? An obvious model to employ was the 
successful scheme used to rebuild Europe and Japan at the con­
clusion of World War II. First, there was a massive contribu­
tion of food, clothing, fuel, and building materials so that 
the survivors could regain the basic necessities of life—food, 
clothing, and shelter. Once the people were reasonably settled, 
seed monies and technologies were introduced to stimulate 
economic growth and development, particularly in the indus­
trial sector (Drucker, 1968; Owens & Shaw, 1972). 
The results of these efforts astounded even the most ex­
pectant development program planners. Within five years allied 
and former enemy countries alike had progressed to a situation 
whereby they were enjoying economic stability, industrial 
growth including independent development, and at least partial 
agricultural self-sufficiency. Why not, then, apply this same 
successful development scheme to the lesser developed countries 
of the Third World. 
Thus, the development assistance programs initiated by 
highly-developed nations during the 1950's and I960's centered 
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around three major areas--food exports to needy nations, 
economic development programs, and the stimulation of the in­
dustrial sector. Although they were not entirely ignored, 
agricultural and rural development programs were looked upon 
as secondary areas of concern. 
This priority ranking of types of development programs was 
reflected ,in many of the Third World nations' own development 
schemes. Pakistan, for example, began preparing its first Five 
Year Plan (1955-1960) in 1953 with the assistance of expertise 
from the United Nations, the Agency for International Develop­
ment, the Food and Agricultural Organization, Harvard Univer­
sity, the International Bank for Reconstruction and Develop­
ment, and the International Monetary Fund. This plan allocated 
almost 65% of its investment monies to the industrial sector 
and the related infrastructures of water, power, transporta­
tion, and communication. Agriculture's share was a mere 9 1/2% 
of the total investment, although some of the allocation for 
water was for the creation of new irrigation systems and the 
improvement of others. Ten years later, Pakistan's third Five 
Year Plan (1965-1970) continued to reflect the same priority 
ratings. The industrial sector and related infrastructures 
were still receiving nearly 60% of the invested funds while 
agriculture's share had increased to just over 15% (Nyrop 
et al. 1971). 
Since the priority rankings had not changed drastically 
in the ensuing 10 years, the development planners were 
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apparently happy with what had happened in the developing world. 
Indeed, some development experts felt that improvements within 
Third World countries had been substantial (Chodak, 1973, 
chap. 5; Merhav, 1969; Bendix, 1969; Apter, 1965). They 
pointed to the increased economic and political stability in 
many of the developing countries, to the increased industrial 
development, and to the successes of the "Green Revolution" in 
agricultural production. They referred to the growth and 
development of the more modem lifestyle enjoyed by an increas­
ing number of persons living in the Third World. The persons 
reasonably happy with the results of the Third World develop­
ment further claimed that the developing nations had progressed 
a long way in the past 20 years or so, and at the very least 
the development programs have helped to eliminate the worst 
situations and have started many nations toward greater self-
sufficiency and stability. 
Other persons working in the development area, however, 
had a much different opinion of the worth of past development 
programs. This group of development experts viewed the devel­
oped programs of the past 20 to 25 years as having ranged from 
not nearly as successful as they could be to unmitigated 
failures (Schumacher, 1973; Owens & Shaw, 1972; United Nations, 
1975; World Bank, 1975). They viewed the apparent economic 
development successes as being at the expense of the majority 
of the people and having benefitted only a small segment of the 
population; they saw the apparent industrial successes as being 
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merely another form of western-nation exploitation; and they 
contended that the main cause of the food and population 
problems that had evolved over the past two decades were the 
result of improperly focused development programs. 
The proponents for a new style of development program 
believed that there was more to development than seed money 
and the transfer of a technology. Such programs would never 
be successful, they claimed, because they only superimposed 
foreign schemata onto an unreceptive audience. They further 
contended that the success of the reconstruction schemes 
following World War II occurred because the societies being 
dealt with were familiar with the technologies, had an educated 
population, had been highly industrialized, and had had all of 
the infrastructures necessary for rapid economic growth. It 
was this familiarity, this acceptance, this knowledge of what 
to do with the offered commodities that was responsible for the 
successes in Europe and Japan. And, according to this group of 
development specialists, it was the lack of all of these things 
that caused the vast majority of past Third World development 
programs to be so unsuccessful. 
The apparent lack of success of Third World development 
projects was acknowledged by most persons involved in that work 
and new forms of development strategies were beginning to 
emerge. One of these new development strategies was termed the 
interdisciplinary approach and it called for development pro­
grams that were totally integrated within the society it was to 
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aid. The interdisciplinary approach to Third World develop­
ment proposed that in addition to the economic aspects of a 
development program, the social, psychological, environmental, 
and humanistic ramifications also had to be considered. 
Papanek (1967), for example, when discussing Pakistan's agri­
cultural development program, stated that development officials 
doubted that a large proportion of cultivators would 
make the necessary decisions. The social, psycholog­
ical, and institutional obstacles might be too great. 
Change might be precluded by the peasant's fatalism, 
the low importance he attaches to economic as against 
other values, the social and political organization 
of the village, the hold of tradition, or the distrust 
of government, (p. 148) 
And when analyzing the results of this Pakistani agricul­
tural development program, Papanek concluded that 
whether new technology was adopted depended in large 
part on the producer's knowledge of the technique and 
on the risk involved. It depended equally on the 
availability of credit and of the required supplies. 
(p. 152) 
Papanek further concluded that "the market alone is inadequate 
to bring about technological changes in peasant agriculture" 
(p. 163). 
Development planners throughout the world had specifi­
cally identified education as a discipline that played a major 
role in a successful development project. Schumacher (1973), 
in his book Small Is Beautiful, contended that development 
begins not with production of goods but with education, organi­
zation, and discipline. He writes: 
If aid is given to introduce certain new economic 
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activities, these will be beneficial and viable only 
if they can be fairly sustained by the already exist­
ing educational level of fairly broad groups of 
people, and they will be truly viable only if they 
promote and spread advances in education, organiza­
tion, and discipline. (p. 159) 
Seers (1969) depicted a country's development in terms of 
solving the problems of poverty, unemployment, and inequality. 
He stated that education could specifically aid in the reduc­
tion of inequality if it was available at all economic levels, 
if it eased shortages of high level manpower, and if it pre­
pared a professional class that was conscious of the realities 
of development. 
If development specialists such as Papanek, Schumacher, 
and others were correct in their claim that for successful 
development to occur an interdisciplinary approach was re­
quired, then two propositions could be put forth. They were: 
(a) that by analyzing a successful development project an 
interdisciplinary element would be recognizable; and (b) that 
by analyzing an unsuccessful development project using an 
interdisciplinary technique the reasons for the project's 
failure would become apparent. This study attempted to test 
these propositions by analyzing two related rural development 
projects using an interdisciplinary methodology. 
One project was conducted in the Punjab region of what 
formerly was West Pakistan (now Pakistan). The other project 
was conducted in the Comilla thana of what formerly was East 
Pakistan (now Bangladesh). In addition to their being rural 
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and in the same nation (Pakistan), both projects were under­
taken in the early 1960's, were government sponsored, involved 
cooperative systems, included American Peace Corps volunteers, 
and included a tractor driver training element. 
The Comilla Project had been recognized as being a suc­
cessful development project (Franda, 1972; Lecerf, 1970). It 
was often referred to when a positive example of rural develop­
ment was required. The results of the Punjab Project, in con­
trast, were not so positive. The Punjab Planning and Develop­
ment Board (1974) and the author's personal experiences as a 
participant in the project both indicated that the project's 
goals and objectives were not met. 
Statement of the Problem 
The problem of this study was to analyze a farm mechani­
zation project conducted in the Punjab region of West Pakistan 
and an integrated rural development project conducted in the 
Comilla thana of East Pakistan, using an interdisciplinary 
methodology. 
Purpose of the Study 
The purpose of this study was threefold: 
1. To discern the successful and unsuccessful elements 
of the specified rural development projects and the reasons 
behind their success or failure. 
2. To ascertain if elements of an interdisciplinary 
approach could be recognized as having been incorporated 
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within each project's design and implementation; 
3. To explore linkages between the success or failure of 
a project and the incorporation of a multidimensional aspect 
within the project. 
Need for the Study-
Development planners throughout the world needed to 
realize the importance of the interdisciplinary approach in 
the formulation of Third World development projects. This need 
was clearly delineated in the Agency for International Develop­
ment's policy determination paper entitled Institutional Grants 
Program (PD-62, October 30, 1974). This agency guideline 
paper, signed by Acting Administrator, John E. Murphy, stated: 
AID is convinced that the solution to many problems 
in the LDC's (lesser developed countries) can be 
solved only through a multi-disciplinary approach, 
and particularly through the application of non-
economic social science perspectives. In determin­
ing grant recipients, AID will favor institutions 
which show the most promise of bringing a multi-
disciplinary approach to the solution of development 
problems, where appropriate. (p, 4) 
This recognized need for an interdisciplinary approach to 
development was emphasized again in 1976 at a meeting held by 
the Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development's 
Committee for Scientific and Technological Policy. In the 
introductory remarks it was noted that: 
The problems to be tackled go beyond the narrowly 
conceived field of Technical assistance. After all, 
technology transfer to LDC's implies an interaction 
among the private sector (private international in­
vestment and business in host countries), government 
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technical assistance agencies, ST policy agencies in 
technology exporting countries and relevant counter­
parts in technology importing countries. Therefore, 
given the nature of the above-mentioned demands, the 
very meaning of international scientific and tech­
nical co-operation for development must ... be 
rethought and re-formulated. (p. 3) 
Further evidence that the governments and their agencies were 
giving high priority to programs that were interdisciplinary in 
nature was recorded in the August 12, 1976, Federal Register. 
There, the U.S. Office of Education announced its Graduate 
International Studies program for 1977-78. Within section 
146.22 of the Federal Register the following statement 
appeared : 
The Commissioner may award grants to and contracts 
with . . . institutions to assist in the initiation 
and development of (1) international components for 
existing problem- or topic-oriented courses of study 
or (2) instruction on a problem or topic of contem­
porary concern to an existing international studies 
program. The resulting program must . . . provide 
course offerings of a comparative or interdiscipli­
nary nature. . Such programs will bring an interdis­
ciplinary and comparative focus to problems, issues, 
or topics of mutual concern among nations. 
The first criterion listed in the section devoted to 
describing the criteria for selection and the awarding of 
grants was "The international nature, contemporary relevance, 
and interdisciplinary and comparative dimensions of the 
program" (146.24). 
A need for this study that was directly related to the 
project under analysis was also identifiable. In a publication 
entitled Punjab Development: Review and Prospects (Third and 
Fourth Issue: June, 1974), published by the Planning and 
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Development Board, Government of the Punjab, Lahore, the 
following statement was recorded: 
Not much progress has been made in the introduction 
of the type of machinery and implements which help 
raise per acre productivity and also are accessible 
to small farmers. To overcome these deficiencies, 
emphases need to be placed on the development and 
introduction of fractional mechanical technology 
and use of small threshers and tractors along with 
the whole range of yield-raising implements meant 
for land preparation, seed/fertilisation, etc. 
Organisational arrangements like co-operatives also 
need to be strengthened, so that mechanical tech­
nology can be made accessible to the small farmers, 
especially those having cultivated area below 12 
acres (this category of farmers suffers from excess 
bullock capacity resulting into unusually large 
percentage of the crop area under fodder at the 
cost of food and fibre crops). (p. 141) 
The type of program suggested in the above statement was 
almost identical to the project under analysis in the study. 
Since there was no consensus regarding the outcome of the 
project, and since it seemed that the project might be re­
peated, it was concluded that a thorough analysis of the first 
farm mechanization project could prove useful to those persons 
planning a similar project in the near future. 
The need for interdisciplinary research related to Third 
World development projects was emphasized by Norman (1974) 
when he stated; 
There has been an increasing number of pleas for 
interdisciplinary approach to research in the de­
veloping world. Lipton [Lipton, M, Interdiscipli­
nary studies in less developed countries. Joint 
Reprint Series No. 35. Brighton, Institute of De­
velopment Studies, University of Sussex. 1970.] 
has forcefully argued for an inter-disciplinary 
approach because of the inability of conventional 
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economic theory, based on a profit maximisation 
goal, to adequately explain the behavior of tradi­
tional farmers in the developing world. (pp. 6-7) 
One of the earlier calls for interdisciplinary research 
in the development of Third World nations came from Roling 
(1966). In an article in Sociologia Ruralis, Roling called 
for the integration of economic theory with rural sociology. 
Roling cited three reasons for why the integration should take 
place. First, 
such phenomena as the growth of modern economies 
depend on behavior which is not implied in economic 
theory. In the second place the control of organ­
izational and other social factors proved to be of 
paramount importance for economic growth. (p. 97) 
Roling's third reason, which Lipton emphasized four years 
later, was that "the less an area is westernized, urbanized, 
and industrialized, the less satisfactorily economic theory 
explains economic behavior in that area" (p. 97). 
DeWilde et al. (1967) chastized both national and inter­
national agencies for not adequately appraising in advance to 
potential outcomes of development projects. DeWilde stated that 
We have repeatedly stressed that these responses can 
be assessed only in the light of all the inter­
related factors--ecological, social, and economic--
that are likely to influence them. (p. 222) 
DeWilde continued by further delineating some of the factors 
that could affect a development project: kinship, political 
organization; land tenure; the division of responsibility by 
sex; labor migration; income and expenditure patterns; and 
outside influences. 
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Regarding the future approach to development, DeWilde 
claimed that: 
For those areas where development has slowed or where 
little or no development has taken place it has now 
become especially important to identify the factors 
that have prevented the emergence of additional 
opportunities to raise production and to determine 
specifically what to do about these factors. Any 
investigation of these limiting factors must focus on 
areas that are clearly defined in terms of ecology 
and human environment. Problems can be identified 
and specific detailed solutions worked out only in 
this way. (pp. 228-229) 
Collinson (1968) also noted the inadequacy of single dis­
cipline research as it was related to Third World development 
projects. Collinson declared that: 
not all the variables in the economic analysis of 
the potential impact of innovations in peasant 
farming systems are quantifiable. Simple cost and 
return relationships may well be misleading as 
innovations usually have wider implications for the 
allocations of resources on the farm unit. Deeper 
analysis may throw up critical management factors 
on which advisory resources should be focused to 
realise the true potential of the innovation con­
cerned. (p. 50) 
Collinson concluded by saying that, 
It is readily demonstrated that thorough analysis 
depends on the availability of information on these 
relationships. It is made particularly important 
when comparisons are needed with the aim of indica­
ting development priorities. Close contact with 
related disciplines is clearly required, (p. 59) 
Propositions of the Study 
Most development experts agreed with two 
general assumptions. They were that (1) development projects 
were multifaceted; and (2) the success of such programs de-
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pended upon the participants' ability to identify the various 
factors involved and to take into account the interactions 
between and the contributions made by each factor. From these 
assumptions then, the following propositions were put forth: 
1. During the planning and operation of a successful 
development project the many relevant dimensions would have 
been taken into account; 
2. During the planning and operation of a development 
project that was eventually deemed unsuccessful, some of the 
relevant dimensions would have been ignored; 
3. A proper accounting of the many dimensions of a 
development project could only be made using an interdisci­
plinary methodology. 
Assumptions of the Study 
Development planners and their critics had only recently 
begun to emphasize the interdisciplinary approach to develop­
ment. This broader outlook on the process of development was 
the result of the understanding and acceptance of certain 
facts and beliefs that underscored this study. 
1. Development projects were multifaceted. 
2. The success of development projects depended upon the 
participants' ability to identify the various factors involved 
and to take into account the interactions between factors 
and the contributions made by each factor. 
3. The interdisciplinary approach would make a valuable 
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contribution to the development process. 
4. Development planners, particularly those concerned 
with Third World nations, needed to understand the interdisci­
plinary approach to development. 
5. Education was one of the disciplines which required 
major emphasis in an interdisciplinary approach to develop­
ment. 
6. Technical education was a major element within the 
broad education category which required emphasis in an inter­
disciplinary approach to development. 
Limitations of the Study 
1. This study was limited to an analysis of the farm 
mechanization project undertaken in the Punjab region, West 
Pakistan in 1961 under the auspices of the Colony Cooperative 
Farming Union, Khanewal, and the Comilla project undertaken 
in the Comilla thana. East Pakistan in 1939, under the aus­
pices of the Pakistan Academy for Rural Development. The 
analysis of these projects was limited to the case studies 
contained in Chapter Three of this study and the documents 
from which the studies were derived. 
2. The technique used for analysis emphasized the inter­
disciplinary approach. 
Statement of the Procedure 
1. A thorough review of the literature concerned with 
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the interdisciplinary approach to development was undertaken. 
2. A thorough review of the literature concerned with 
the setting within which the specified development projects 
were undertaken as well as the projects themselves was under­
taken. Government documents, relevant periodicals and 
journals, case studies, and general texts were reviewed. 
From the material reviewed above, a detailed description 
of the selected development projects was formulated. 
3. Using an interdisciplinary technique, the selected 
development projects were analyzed. 
The analysis of the selected rural development projects 
was conducted by answering a series of 39 questions that were 
interdisciplinary in nature. Thirty-five of these questions 
were listed in Diaz Bordenave's essay "Communication of Agri­
cultural Innovations in Latin America: The Need for New 
Models" (Communication Research. 1976, 3, 135-154). The re­
maining four questions were identified by Patricia Hill, in a 
casual paper entitled "Diffusion of Innovation qua Transfer of 
Technology Critique, Comments, and Recommendations" (Journal­
ism Department, Iowa State University, 1976). To simplify the 
analysis, the questions were partially rewritten and reorga­
nized from their original form (see Appendix) into seven 
general categories. The categories and the questions they 
contained were as follows : 
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Cultural 
VJhat was the historical genesis of [the social organiza­
tion]? 
Were the farmers consulted and were their needs for in­
novation ascertained? 
Did the innovations take into account regional and local 
differences in ecology, economy, farming habits, and cultural 
norms? 
What were the feedback possibilities and channels for the 
farmers to communicate their needs and results to the innova­
tion sources and policy-makers? 
What were the relationships between the processes of 
[human development], formal education, organization, politiza-
tion, and technification of the rural population? 
Economic 
Did the majority of the farmers own their land, either 
individually or cooperatively? 
Who controlled the economic institutions, particularly the 
market, credit, and input supply organizations? 
[Did the adoption of the proffered innovations] promote 
employment or unemployment, fixation of the rural population 
or migration to the cities, enrichment of the already rich or 
better income distribution? 
Educational 
How adequate were the change agents or extension service 
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personnel as a two-way communication channel? 
Were [the change agents or extension service personnel] 
technically competent, ideologically oriented to the welfare 
of the farmers, methodologically adequate? 
How did farmers diagnose and solve their problems? 
How did [farmers] search for extracommunity resources and 
help? 
How well-developed [was the farmers'] communication 
ability? 
What were the personal and group roles in farmers' 
problem-solving? 
Were the skills necessary for [the] maintenance [of 
adopted innovations] available? 
Political 
How autonomous or independent was the country from ex­
ternal forces which affected its economy and its political 
decisions? 
What criteria were used to guide the choice of innovations 
for diffusion - (a) the common welfare, (b) the increase of 
production for export, (c) the maintenance of low prices for 
urban consumers, (d) the profit of big commercial farmers and 
landowners? 
[What effects did the adoption of certain innovations 
have] on regional and national development in the short, 
medium, and long range? 
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Was there communication monopoly, censorship, blockage, or 
distortion? 
Were farmers organized in pressure groups that could exert 
influence on the social structure of land tenure, on the 
production infrastructure, and on the marketing system so as 
to facilitate the diffusion of appropriate innovations? 
Psychological 
Was there any degree of coercion necessary for the adop­
tion of an innovation, either by the market situation, the 
credit institutions, the government, the landlords? 
What was the role of mass media advertising? 
Was [mass media] persuading farmers to adopt innovations 
that were really needed or that they did not need? 
Were [the products and techniques being diffused] adequate 
to the stage of technological, economic, and social development 
in the nation? 
[Did the new innovations] require the establishment of 
new systems of credit, land tenure, technical assistance, 
marketing, and insurance? 
How adequate were the communication channels' content and 
treatment of the innovation in relation to the needs of the 
farmers? 
Sociological 
How was the rural social structure organized, and what 
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influence did it exert over individual decision-making? 
Who decided what kinds of innovations would be diffused 
and developed? 
What effects did the adoption of certain innovations have 
on individual and family welfare? 
What kind of living and learning adjustments did the 
innovations require from the farmers? 
Who controlled the sources and channels of communication 
for the innovations? 
[Was mass communication] at the service of all the farmers 
or mainly at the service of the government, the input indus­
tries, the buyers of farm products, the larger farmers, the 
consumer groups? 
Which were the institutions that directly or indirectly 
transferred technology to the farmers? 
What . . . conditions affected the continued availability 
of auxiliary technologies? 
Technical 
Did [farmers] own their agricultural tools? 
How appropriate and well-proven were the products and 
techniques being diffused? 
Was technification promoted and executed without efforts 
for simultaneous [human development] ? 
What auxiliary technologies were needed to render the use 
of the proposed technology viable? 
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From whom was [the proposed technology] obtained, an 
external or an internal source? 
4. The resultant findings were related and conclusions 
drawn. 
5. Recommendations were made. 
Definition of Terms 
1. Development : A process of improving the capability 
of a society and its institutions to meet the increasing and 
changing needs and demands of the total population (L, Wilcox, 
lecture in Sociology for Development: Sociology 542X, Iowa 
State University, December 15, 1975). 
2. Farm mechanization; The use of machine power for 
selected agricultural operations like land leveling, land 
preparation, cultivation, harvesting, etc., . . . for [the 
purpose of] increasing the area under cultivation and in­
creasing the cropping intensity and crop productivity (Punj ab 
Development: Review and Prospects. Lahore, Pakistan: 
Planning and Development Board, Government of Pakistan, 1974, 
pp. 138-139). 
3. Interdisciplinary : Implies integration of disciplines 
through joint projects (D. W. Norman, Inter-disciplinary 
Research on Rural Development. OLC Paper No. 6, April, 1974, 
p. 6). 
4. Multidisciplinary: Implies researchers from more than 
one discipline who do not necessarily communicate with one 
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another (D. W. Norman, Inter-disciplinary Research on Rural 
Development. OLC Paper No. 6, April, 1974, p. 6). 
5. Technology: The accumulation of artifacts and mental 
processes used by the human race in its attempt to create a 
better life environment (Synthesis of Definition by W. Gunston 
in E. de Bono (Ed.) Technology Today. London: Routledge and 
Kegan Paul Ltd. 1971, p. 60). 
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CHAPTER II. REVIEW OF LITERATURE 
Introduction 
During the decades following the Second World War, 
development of less developed countries (LDC's) was focused 
almost exclusively on improving those nations' economies. 
More specifically, the development strategies placed primary 
emphasis on expanding the industrial sector of the LDC's 
economy. As early as 1958, however, a few persons involved 
with aiding the development of LDC's had begun to question the 
validity of a single discipline approach to development. 
Hirschman (1958), for example, having reviewed the econom 
ic development problems of LDC's stated that: 
Our diagnosis has one special characteristic: it 
is not concerned with the lack of one or even of 
several needed factors or elements (capital, educa­
tion, etc.) that must be combined with other elements 
to produce economic development, but with the de­
ficiency in the combining process itself. Our 
diagnosis is simply that countries fail to take ad­
vantage of their development potential because, for 
reasons largely related to their image of change, 
they find it difficult to take the decisions needed 
for development in the required number and at the 
required speed. Capital or technical education are 
scarce or the banking system is inadequate because 
the country has found it difficult to take the steps 
necessary to create, direct, or procure capital, to 
spread education, and to introduce the proper insti­
tutions . 
If backwardness is due to insufficient number and 
speed of development decisions and to inadequate 
performance of developmental tasks, then the funda­
mental problem of development consists in generating 
and energizing human action in a certain direction, 
(p. 25) 
Hirschman viewed this LDC development process as being 
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similar to a highly-developed country's economic depression. 
He claimed that 
The "lack of confidence" that rules in a depression 
is easily dispelled compared to the . . . reluctance 
to agree to priorities and to uneven change in the 
case of the group-focused image of change, and the 
difficulties of agreement-reaching and cooperation-
enlisting in the case of the ego-focused image. 
These reluctances and difficulties can be overcome 
only slowly. Then, the taking of development 
decisions is held back not by physical obstacles 
and scarcities, but by imperfections in the de­
cision-making process. Development theory and 
policy therefore face the task of examining under 
what conditions development decisions can be called 
forth in spite of these imperfections, through 
pacing devices or inducement mechanisms, (p. 26) 
At about the same time, other development planners noted 
that although the industrial sector was improving in terms of 
measurable economic gains in many of the LDC's, the standard 
of living for all but a relatively few persons remained un­
changed or had declined. The major reason for this phenomenon 
appeared to be that while the vast majority of the LDC citizens 
lived in the rural parts of the nation, the development pro­
grams emphasized the industrial growth of urban areas. There­
fore, development planners began to include the rural and 
agricultural sectors in their development schemes. 
The results of the development planners' endeavors, how­
ever, have not been overwhelmingly successful. Nearly 20 
years later, McNamara (1975) in the forward to Uma Lele's book 
The Design of Rural Development: Lessons from Africa, re­
ported that: 
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How to raise productivity among the rural poor in 
developing countries is one of the two or three most 
urgent questions confronting the international de­
velopment community today. 
The scale of the problem is immense : Of the 2,000 
million people in the World Bank's developing 
member countries, roughly 1,500 million live on the 
land, and nearly half of those are entrapped in what 
can only be described as absolute poverty. 
The number of the absolute poor increases and 
their enforced degradation deepens with every passing 
year, despite more than two decades of extraordinary 
worldwide economic growth. 
The problem is not merely that the benefits of 
economic growth have been inequitably distributed, 
as they have, but that the poor themselves have been 
unable to contribute to that growth. 
The solution, then, lies in raising the productiv­
ity of the poor, so that their own incomes can rise 
as those of others in their societies do. 
But how? So far no one has the complete answers 
.... (p. v) 
McNamara's final statement raised the following questions: 
1. What were the incomplete answers that had been sug­
gested to date? 
2. Could the partial answers be integrated into a com­
plete answer? 
In an attempt to answer the first question, the interdisci­
plinary approaches to development that had been suggested by 
various development experts, from Hirschman in 1958 to the 
present were reviewed. Single discipline approaches were not 
included in this review for the following reasons: 
1. The general lack of success of single discipline ap­
proaches to development for the past 20 years. 
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2. By its very definition, an interdisciplinary approach 
extracted ideas from various disciplines and incorporated them 
with other ideas from other disciplines. Therefore, each of 
the disciplines normally involved in development would have 
its ideas represented. 
Since the idea of interdisciplinary development was being 
discussed at the same time that the need for rural development 
became obvious, most of the interdisciplinary approaches were 
concerned with aiding the rural population of the LDC's. The 
remainder of this study was an attempt to answer the second 
question raised by McNamara? s statement. 
Interdisciplinary Approaches to Development 
Although the works cited in the following review of 
literature advocated an interdisciplinary approach to develop­
ment, many of them still placed an emphasis on a specific 
discipline. Therefore, those approaches emphasizing similar 
disciplines were grouped together. Those approaches that were 
deemed too broad to fit a specific discipline were grouped in­
to a general category. 
Socio-cultural 
In the summary and conclusions section of their book en­
titled, Tales of Two City-States ; The Development Progress of 
Hong Kong and Singapore, Geiger and Geiger (1973) claimed that 
many developing as well as developed nations dismissed the 
progress made by Singapore and Hong Kong as being the result 
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of the special socio-cultural characteristics of the Chinese 
people. As such, then, non-Chinese countries could not dupli­
cate the processes with any degree of success. The authors, 
however, viewed the development progress of the two city-
states as being just as relevant as the successes in any other 
part of the world. 
At the same time, Geiger and Geiger were well aware that 
just because a development strategy was successful in one 
situation it does not guarantee that it will be successful in 
a second situation. As they pointed out, "actual economic and 
political systems do not exist in isolation. They are in­
extricably interrelated . . . with the other institutional and 
cultural systems" (p. 24). Therefore, a particular development 
strategy was not likely to work if it was not compatible to the 
other elements of the society to which it was applied. 
Saxena (1973) discussed modernization in terms of whether 
or not attitudinal and behavioral changes in individuals could 
significantly account for a change in the social system as a 
whole, and vice versa. In the social system as a whole, Saxena 
included such characteristics as social mobility, increased 
urbanization, education, industrialization, and mechanization. 
When discussing individuals, Saxena referred to attitudes, 
values, orientations, and behaviors necessary to participate 
in a modern society. By modernization, Saxena meant "a con­
tinuous change from one state of affairs to another, from a 
traditional way of life to a nontraditional and rapidly chang­
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ing style of life which conforms to group patterns and expec­
tations" (p. 18). 
When discussing the results of the research regarding 
modernization of a society, Saxena concluded that: 
From these observations there emerges a proposition 
that suggests that even if an individual is low on a 
variable, but lives in a system that is high on that 
variable, he will be more modern than someone who is 
high on a variable but lives in a system that is low 
on that variable, given that the variable under con­
sideration is related to modernization, (p. 26) 
Neihoff and Anderson (1964) suggested that a key member 
in the development process was the innovator or the change 
agent, and that the process itself was determined by the ac­
tions of the change agent and the reactions of the recipients. 
They then divided the recipient reactions into the categories 
of (a) the motivations for accepting or rejecting the innova­
tions, and (b) the characteristics of the traditional culture 
which favor or retard acceptance of the innovation. 
Neihoff and Anderson claimed that the motivations and 
characteristics were either positive, negative, or neutral 
toward developmental change. They further stated that some of 
these factors could only be positive while others could only 
be negative (see Figure 1). 
In a very different approach to development, Mboya (1962) 
saw the problem of development as being much more complex 
than did the Geigers, Saxena, or Neihoff and Anderson. Mboya 
described the plight of the LDC nations of Africa as being not 
only interdisciplinary but also macroscopic in magnitude. His 
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Plan (of innovation) 
Behavior of 
Innovator 
ACTION REACTION 
Behavior of 
Recipients 
I Communication (estab­
lished) 
II Role (image created) 
III Demonstration (of in­
novation) 
IV Participation (obtained) 
V Traditional Culture 
(utilization of) 
VI Environment (utiliza­
tion of) 
VII Timing (utilization of) 
VIII Flexibility (of imple­
mentation) 
IX Continuity (of imple­
mentation) 
X Maintenance (estab­
lished) 
I XI Motivation 
A. Felt Need 
B. Practical Benefit 
C. Prestige Emulation 
D. Competition 
E. Reward 
F. Novelty 
XII Traditional Culture 
A. Social structure 
1. Role (individual) 
2. Status (individual) 
3. Kinship 
4. Caste-class 
5. Ethnic 
6. Political 
7. Central authority 
8. Vested interest 
9. Leadership 
10. Religious frater­
nity 
B. Economic Pattern 
C. Beliefs 
1. Theological 
2. Magical 
3. Medical 
4. Realistic fatalism 
5. Project negativism 
Recreation Pattern D. 
E. 
F. 
Consumption Pattern 
Value System 
INTEGRATION 
Figure 1. Actions and reactions during the introduction 
of an innovation. (Niehoff & Anderson, p. 6) 
30 
view was that development must be recognized as a problem of 
continental and global dimensions, not one of the individual 
and the village. In Mboya's opinion; 
Africa is one of the underdeveloped continents of the 
world. Socially, Africa is underdeveloped in the 
sense that its tribal components have not yet found 
a proven basis for collective action. Furthermore, 
Africa is socially underdeveloped because there is 
almost no social and cultural traffic between English-
and French-speaking Africa. The culture imposed on 
us sticks like burrs. 
Economically, Africa is underdeveloped in the sense 
that mass poverty is universal. This poverty is not 
entirely due to poor natural resources, and hence it 
could definitely be lessened by methods already proved 
successful in other parts of the world. It is re­
flected in deficiencies like the shortage of schools, 
social services, hospitals, universities, and tech­
nical institutions. It is further reflected in the 
number of our women who die in childbirth, the uni­
versality of malnutrition, high incidence of various 
diseases, low wages, and in the contrast between the 
luxury and affluence of Europe and North America on 
the one hand, and the slum conditions and poverty 
prevailing in Africa on the other, (pp. 43-45) 
"Development demands and produces far-reaching changes in 
societies; the fabric of social life becomes altered, social 
attitudes change" (p. 11). So stated Mountjoy in the intro­
duction to his book. Developing the Underdeveloped Countries, 
(1971). Institutional arrangements, political conditions, 
adverse terms of trade, human conditions, social customs, and 
psychological obstacles all could have an effect, positively 
or negatively, on development plans he concluded. 
When expanding on the human factor's importance to the 
process of development. Mountjoy claimed that many human 
factors were extremely difficult to incorporate into the 
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development scheme or were obstacles to a successful develop­
ment effort. Examples given by Mountjoy included land tenure 
systems, the quality of government bureaucracy, and level of 
traditionalism within the culture and social customs. As an 
example of a psychological obstacle. Mountjoy quoted an 
article in The Times by J. Ardagh (1969); "A lack of flair 
for mechanics, lack of a sense of maintenance or belief in 
mechanics, so that clocks, telephones and typewriters are left 
unmended more through apathy than absence of skill" (p. 12). 
Moore (1974) called for cooperation between the social 
sciences and earth sciences in the study of agricultural 
development projects in developing countries. Moore's 
reasons for requesting the integration of these sciences to 
solve agricultural problems included: (1) that ecology was a 
major factor in shaping rural societies; (2) there was a need 
to study the interrelationships between ecology and society; 
and (3) there was a need to study the effects of climate on a 
society. 
Moore also claimed that there were interrelationships in 
rural societies between the society, its economics and its 
health standards; and between the economic and social organi­
zation and its demography. For these reasons, argued Moore, 
single discipline studies were not a realistic alternative for 
the study of rural societies. Instead, interdisciplinary 
studies were required if "successful" analyses of rural 
societies were to be forthcoming. 
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Educational 
In addition to Schumacher and Seers, whose development 
theories were outlined in the introductory chapter, two 
others also placed major emphasis on the educational aspects 
of development. Long (1971) also made a strong appeal for an 
interdisciplinary approach to development, but his emphasis 
was toward the inclusion of interdisciplinary research in the 
universities. When discussing societal problems, Long stated 
that although they have scientific and technological aspects, 
"their solutions . . . demand the simultaneous and inter­
active efforts of . . . scientists, engineers, social scien­
tists, political scientists, lawyers, and doctors, to name 
only the most obvious" (p. 961). Rather than look at uni­
versities as discipline-oriented institutions. Long stated, 
they should be viewed as the repositories of the required 
expertise. 
But the most important reason for including univer­
sities in interdisciplinary research, according to Long, was 
to allow the students the opportunity to learn about and 
participate in an interdisciplinary effort. Long emphasized 
that "this can only happen when their professors have personal 
knowledge of and commitment to interdisciplinary research and 
when there are programs wherein students can leam by doing" 
(p. 961). 
Developing nations are not the only places where develop­
ment was failing, claimed Wignaraja (1976). The affluent, 
33 
mostly Western nations of the highly-developed world also had 
failed in their own development attempts. Wignaraja pointed 
to the polluted environment, wasted resources, and the fear 
and anxiety concerning basic value systems in the highly-
developed nations. He argued that they were comparable to the 
lack of basic necessities of food, clothing, medical facili­
ties, and safe drinking water in LDC's. 
Wignaraja, therefore, called for a complete restructuring 
of the thought processes related to development. Such a re­
thinking would require new information, retraining, and a new 
educational methodology. But most importantly, stated 
Wignaraja, the research into the new rethinking cannot be done 
by individuals or individual disciplines. Instead it must be 
a collaborative effort on the part of individuals and insti- • 
tutions, all of whom must have a common shared goal, Wignaraja 
emphasized. 
Economic 
Like Hirschman, Taake (1975) also saw an overemphasis on 
the economic aspects of development when discussing the plan­
ning of development projects. He stated that "macroeconomic 
planning was primarily regarded as a logical procedure with 
the aim of calculating a consistent set of targets and instru­
ments" (p. 3). The result of this almost total emphasis on 
the economic aspects of development, as Taake put it, was that 
developing countries were "inundated with an excessive supply 
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of econometric model building, but it became increasingly 
difficult to specifically orient these programming techniques 
to the actual needs ... in the developing countries" (p. 3). 
The recognition of a slow, gradual, but steady trend away 
from total economic development planning was a trend that could 
only lead to improved development projects, Taake felt. He was 
enthused by the more frequent recognition of the associated 
problems of goal definition, decision-making, political 
structures, organization, and implementation at the planning 
stages of development programs. 
The overwhelming emphasis placed on economic development 
by development planners also came under sharp criticism from 
Geiger (1967). To too many development planners, claimed 
Geiger, development was equated solely with accelerating the 
economic growth of an LDC. "Their economies were assumed to 
be autonomous systems affected by the other aspects of a 
society to so minor an extent," stated Geiger, "that they 
could be disregarded in the preparation and carrying out of 
development policies" (pp. x - xi). Geiger contended that the 
fallacy of this approach to development could be seen in what 
he called "the manifest failure of so many development strate­
gies focused on economic growth per se" (p. xii). 
Geiger conceded that substantial and sustained increases 
in production were essential to a successful development pro­
ject. However, he felt that these components of a development 
project were affected by other aspects of the society as well, 
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and that the recognition of this continuous interaction was 
necessary for the operation of a successful development pro­
ject. According to Geiger, "Development is a highly complex 
process of interrelated changes in all the major systems— 
political, economic, and social-institutional—of a society 
and in the values, concepts, attitudes, and norms contained in 
its culture" (p. xi). 
Wilkinson (1973) argued for the necessity of creating a 
new view toward development, one that was not so wedded to 
economic theory. He claimed that too often social science re­
search was sectarian in its attitude. Wilkinson called for an 
interdisciplinary approach to development so that development 
planners might be able to draw from all available sources. 
As an example of this need, Wilkinson quoted T. W. Swan: 
We all know that in models of economic growth we can 
produce stagnation crisis, Malthusian traps, infla­
tion barriers, take-off instability situations, even 
trade cycles, at the drop of a symbolic cliche.^  The 
trouble is that any one of quite a lot of cliches 
will do. We also know that if we were asked to think 
about a five-year plan for India we would not look to 
economic theory for ready answers ; we would need to 
leam a great deal about India, about people, about 
practical techniques. T. W. Swan, "Golden Ages and 
production functions', in Amartya Sen (Ed.) Growth 
Economics. (Harmondsworth, 1970), p. 203. (p.l) 
Political 
During his analysis of integrated rural development 
programs, Ruttan (1975) asked the following question: "Why is 
it possible to identify a number of relatively successful 
small-scale or pilot rural development projects but so diffi­
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cult to find examples of successful rural development programs?" 
(p. 10). To seek an answer to his question, Ruttan delved into 
three specific areas of literature: writings related to the 
urban-industrial impact hypothesis; writings on the theory of 
induced technical change; and writings on the new models of 
institutional change. 
Ruttan stated that the primary reason why successful 
small-scale development projects could be found while large-
scale development programs could not was that the success of 
small-scale projects was usually attributable to individual 
human devotion to the project. When the successful pilot pro­
ject was attempted on a national scale the intensity of the 
individual human devotion could not be maintained. In addi­
tion, Ruttan continued, turning the project over to a central­
ized government agency or bureaucracy often resulted in the 
local directors losing the right to tailor the project to the 
local situation. Local initiative was sacrificed for admin­
istrative convenience, Ruttan concluded. 
Eastman (1976) wondered why Peru, after some 22 years of 
technical assistance from the University of North Carolina and 
additional input from the Iowa State University technical 
mission, had not increased its agricultural production. His 
analysis of the project related that the technical assistance 
from those universities concentrated on biological technology, 
credit, and extension education. Using Mosher's outline of 
agricultural development (in Getting Agriculture Moving. New 
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York: Frederick A. Praeger, 1966), Eastman found that a 
successful agricultural development project must contain inputs 
such as seed, fertilizer and pesticides, markets, price in­
centives, transportation for both inputs and outputs, credit 
and extension education, the latter two not essential but 
helpful. But of the others, Eastman wrote "If even one of 
these essentials is absent, no increase will occur" (p. 25). 
Turning back to the Peruvian agricultural programs, 
Eastman found that the two American university missions had 
produced numerous studies on the marketing, transportation, 
inputs, and price supports in addition to their emphasis of 
the biological, credit, and extension dimensions of the pro­
ject. However, Eastman found that 
Consciously or unconsciously, the government elected 
to go with alternative policies. Among other things, 
food prices were kept low and adequate fertilizer 
was not imported. Nor did the technical advisors 
push very hard on the sensitive political issues. 
They preferred to remain aloof from the hard poli­
tical decisions required for successful agricultural 
programs, (p. 25) 
Psychological 
Among the earliest of proponents for an interdisciplin­
ary approach to development was McClelland. McClelland (1961) 
discussed his interdisciplinary approach to development in 
terms of increasing indigenous incentive systems. McClelland's 
thesis was that a psychological need for achievement was re­
sponsible for economic growth. He termed this need an n 
38 
achievement. Conversely, he claimed that a lack of n achieve-
was responsible for economic decline and stagnation. 
McClelland theorized that the forces that produced rapid 
economic development were inherent within the human being and 
manifested themselves through basic motivations and the methods 
and means of social organization. McClelland felt that to 
stimulate development a country needed to: break its orienta­
tion toward tradition and diversify its cultural, social, and 
economic activities; increase the n achievement of its popula­
tion; provide a better allocation of existing n achievement 
resources. 
But the question remained of how a development programmer 
might accomplish these tasks of reducing traditionalism and 
conservatism and increasing innovâtiveness. 
Kunkel (1976) postulated that the heart of any analysis of 
development should be the psychological dimension of the pro­
ject. This was because the psychological dimension would de­
scribe "the specific linkages between development processes 
on various preceding and concomitant phenomena which the usual 
economic and sociological approaches are wont to bypass or 
simply assume" (p. 651), Kunkel stated. 
Kunkel claimed that all psychological analyses of develop­
ment followed a general paradigm (see Figure 2). In explain­
ing this paradigm, Kunkel stated that economic and sociological 
analyses of development deal only with the concepts enclosed in 
the triangles, while "psychological approaches postulate that 
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Figure 2. Paradigm of psychological approaches to development. 
(Kunkel, 1976, p. 651) 
social, economic, cultural, and historical variables influence 
development through psychological elements (enclosed in a 
circle)" (p. 651). Kunkel further explained that these sig­
nificant variables were all derived from a particular model of 
man. 
When analyzing Pakistan's agricultural development, 
Papanek (1967) pointed out that when government officials 
attempted to increase production through marketing incentives 
alone, the project was not successful. Papanek claimed that 
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this was because the market incentives did nothing about the 
farmers' lack of technical knowledge (by 1960 only 10% had 
visited demonstration plots and less than 5% had seen an 
extension worker), the lack of necessary inputs (inferior seed 
grain was being provided by government seed farms; fertilizer, 
water, and seed was unavailable in many districts), and the 
lack of purchasing power of the subsistence farmer. 
Papanek stated that when the government provided the 
additional incentives and necessary inputs during the five-
year period from 1960-1965, production increased dramatically. 
The difference, according to Papanek, was that in addition to 
market incentives, the Pakistani farmers were profiting from 
"higher and more stable output prices and . . . subsidized in­
puts; improved . . . water, transportation, seeds, and other 
inputs; and a larger role for private initiative." Pananek 
concluded, "The key to increased production in the short run 
was water and fertilizer, with private initiative of great 
importance in expanding the use of both" (pp. 182-183). 
The importance of incentives in the industrial develop­
ment process was also emphasized by Mason (1972). Mason con­
cluded that developing countries needed to emphasize incentive 
systems that would increase local, labor intensive industries, 
use national investments and local equipment, and train in­
digenous workers for skilled and managerial positions. 
Mason made his conclusions having observed that the in­
dustrial sectors of many LDC's suffer from low labor absorption 
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and high capital investment, just the reverse of the prescribed 
needs for developing countries. Mason offered the following 
interrelated reasons for the occurrence of the phenomena: 
Incentive schemes designed to induce investment in the 
less developed countries result in factor and commod­
ity market price distortions. The distortions tend to 
encourage the use of too much capital in relation to 
labor. 
Small markets and monopoly advantage reduce the 
incentive to engineer appropriate technologies. 
Artificial technological fixity reduces the options 
available, i.e., firms fail to fully consider rela­
tive factor prices in their decisions on choice of 
technique. 
Technologies appropriate to conditions in less 
developed countries do not exist. 
Skill shortages make impossible the application 
of labor intensive technologies, i.e., capital is 
substituted for labor to circumvent skill shortages. 
Multinational firms confront different factor prices 
than local firms, i.e., they obtain their capital in 
international markets at more favorable rates than 
those available to locally controlled firms and con­
sequently they use more capital. 
The demonstration effect operates to artificially 
constrain the options considered for use by local 
entrepreneurs, i.e., local firms emulate multi­
national firms, (pp. 9-10) 
Technical 
When discussing Third World agriculture, Jacoby (1974) 
described the judging of technological progress in agriculture 
as being conducted mostly in terms of yields per acre, amount 
of fertilizer used, capital investments, labor input, and the 
substitution of capital for labor. This type of analysis, 
Jacoby believed, "will necessarily mislead public opinion with 
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regard to the real effects of new technologies upon the weak 
economic system of underdeveloped countries" (p. 203). 
Jacoby emphasized that in addition to increased output 
and economic measurements, technological advances in agri­
culture also have a profound effect upon such societal dimen­
sions as employment, man-land relationships, and social 
stratification. Jacoby concluded by stating, "I do believe, 
however, that it would be essential if interdisciplinary re­
search on this subject could be conducted with the participa­
tion of economists, agricultural scientists, and sociologists 
(p. 204). 
Also.calling for an interdisciplinary approach to farm 
mechanization projects, Stevens and Ahmad (1971) posed the 
question, "How can governments be expected to make improved 
decisions if the involved professionals cannot come to agree­
ment on objectives, methodology, and recommendations" (p. 32) 
To the authors there was no question of the interdisciplinary 
pects of development. Mechanization programs, they stated, 
had the interdisciplinary dimensions of engineering, biology, 
economics, and technical training. No one discipline was 
capable of making the comprehensive analysis required so that 
effective policy decisions could be made by government offi­
cials, Stevens and Ahmad claimed. Therefore "a formal or in­
formal interdisciplinary effort . . . seems to be essential" 
(p. 31). 
Using technological choice as the focal point, Vietorisz 
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(1974) also exemplified the interdisciplinary aspects of devel­
opment. In an article entitled "Diversification, Linkage, and 
Integration Focus in the Technology Policies of Developing 
Countries," Vietorisz listed a series of questions that, in 
his opinion, ought to be asked of each technological choice. 
These questions demonstrated the extent to which development 
had so many interrelated parts. The questions were: 
What does the technical alternative contribute to 
institution building? Does it stimulate new skills, 
new capabilities, new organization? 
Does it lead to technological autonomy or a 
perpetuation of dependency, especially mother com­
panies in foreign countries? 
Does the technological alternative contribute to­
ward societal integration? Does it weaken class 
barriers, promote mobility? 
Does it contribute toward technological integra­
tion? Does it help to tie together universities and 
research institutions with producing enterprises? 
Is the technological alternative compatible with 
reasonable resource management at the national level? 
(p. 76) 
During the study and analysis of Asian agriculture de­
velopment, Haseyama (1974) paid particular attention to the 
green revolution. His conclusions included the statement that 
many of the Asian countries lacked the agricultural infra­
structure required for a successful green revolution. Further, 
Haseyama claimed that his analysis showed that most Asian 
countries were not yet able to make the necessary economic 
allocations required, nor did they have sufficient technical 
training or technical knowledge to create the needed environ-
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ment for a successful green revolution. 
Specifically, Haseyama stated that the following factors 
were required for a successful green revolution to occur in 
Asia: 
(1) Advance agricultural infrastructure on the 
production side, particularly irrigation both in area 
and quality. 
(2) Make available required agricultural input 
materials and development of credit facilities to 
provide farmers with funds to obtain input materials. 
(3) Make institutional reforms to improve the 
current disparity of land and income distribution. 
(4) Improve quality of HYV [high-yielding 
varieties] grain, which is often inferior to tra­
ditional varieties. 
(5) Improve capacity of proper post-harvest 
treatment, and such post-harvest infrastructure as 
storage, transportation, stable marketing system, 
etc. (p. 104) 
Gotsch (1972), when reporting on tractor mechanization and 
rural development in Pakistan stated that "to understand the 
issue of mechanization in Pakistan one clearly has to go be­
yond social accounting to its institutional and political di­
mensions" (pp. 21-22). Gotsch further reported that the 
general processes of economic and political change related to 
development could also be specifically related to mechaniza­
tion. Thus, all had common dimensions. Examples of these 
interrelationships presented by Gotsch included: 
1. more available water created greater demands for 
power ; 
2. the new technology conflicted with traditional forms 
of land tenancy; 
3. the new technology provided cash surplus with which 
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to purchase new equipment; 
4. foreign agencies became willing to finance equipment 
imports because they recognized a potential for increasing 
agricultural output; 
5. the political structure that developed in the rural 
areas was compatible with mechanization programs. 
Gotsch also reported on a Ford Foundation project in 
Pakistan in which an attempt was made to work with the affluent 
farmers to replicate the type and methods of agricultural tech­
nology that were found in southwestern United States. Accord­
ing to Gotsch, the results of this attempt at mechanization 
"was a much publicized report on farm power that advocated a 
rapid expansion of tractor availability but failed to deal 
adequately either with alternatives or with the concept of 
social costs and benefits" (p. 12), 
To substantially raise the income of the poor, reported 
Mellor (1977), would mean an almost astronomical increase in 
the demand for food, requiring increased production rates far 
greater than anything achieved to date. Therefore, claimed 
Mellor, an increased food supply should be the prime production 
goal of development. This could be accomplished through in­
vestment in new agricultural technology. 
The second step that must be taken, according to Mellor, 
would be to reduce capital requirements per worker in the in­
dustrial sector. Third, the export and import rates must both 
be increased in order to decrease capital intensity. Finally, 
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the fourth step that Mellor outlined in the process of raising 
the income of the poor was to decentralize planning and ad­
ministrative procedures, and a change in emphasis from regula­
tory to facilitatory procedures. 
However, Clay (1975) contended that technical change in a 
development project required a sequencing and packaging of in­
novations. "It is the overall impact of a complementary pack­
age that is important and not necessarily the characteristics 
of one component" (p. 74). Clay also claimed that economic 
analyses of technological change often took for granted or 
ignored inherent institutional change. This would result in 
an incorrect analysis, stated Clay, because in many cases the 
institutions needed to complement the technological change were 
unavailable or unable to respond in the required manner. 
Clay's case in point was a rural development project in 
Bihar state of India. Having analyzed the project. Clay con­
cluded that choices made by officials, first in the choice of 
tubewells, and second in the decision to introduce tractors 
rather than power tillers, and third in the unrealistic collat­
eral requirements of the involved credit agencies, all impeded 
the progress of the project. This, he continued, "ensured 
that a higher proportion of the benefits accrued to larger 
landholders through own use of equipment and earning economic 
rents on the supply of scarce machine services" (p. 86). The 
project also had the effect of making the small farmers de­
pendent upon the larger landowners for some of the necessary 
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inputs, thus reversing a traditional pattern of transactions; 
previously, the large landowner was dependent upon the labor 
provided to him by the small farmers. 
The Canadian Hunger Foundation (1976), on the other hand, 
was concerned that development planners and analyzers would de­
vote too much attention to the technology being introduced 
and not enough to the other interrelated aspects of the con­
cerned society. The authors stated that 
An approach which looks only at purely technical 
aspects would neglect the dynamic interrelationships 
among the technology in whatever form it takes, the 
users of the technology and their attitudes and 
values, the resource base of the region, and the 
economic and political structures surrounding the 
other factors, (pp. A2-A3) 
The authors concluded by warning that if there were restricting 
limitations in any of the above areas, the chances for even a 
partially successful development project would be severely 
hampered. 
General 
The following approaches to interdisciplinary development 
did not emphasize a specific discipline. Rather, they were more 
general in scope, Owens and Shaw (1972, 1974), for example, 
proposed that only in modernizing societies were there "ex­
plicit efforts made to involve the populace in planning their 
own futures'* (p. 4), an essential ingredient for successful 
development projects. Dual societies, they offered, were 
simply extensions of ruler-ruled traditional societies in 
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which decisions came from the top and left little or no room 
for the individuals to participate in their own destiny. The 
important characteristics of a dual and a modernizing society 
were compared in Table 1. 
Table 1. Important characteristics of dual and modernizing 
societies (Owens & Shaw, 1972, 1974, pp. 12-13) 
Dual Modernizing 
Characteristics of 
Local Govepiments and 
Other Local Organiza­
tions 
Organized problem-
solving system 
Decision-making 
authority 
Financial resources 
Written records (for 
both public and 
individual use) 
Leadership positions 
Planned effort to in­
duce transfer of 
loyalties from tra­
ditional to new 
institutions 
Concept of local 
development 
Organization of Space 
for Economic Activities 
Inadequate 
Nominal 
Limited, essen­
tially static 
Rare, not increas­
ing; people rely 
on memory 
Few; number not 
increasing much 
No 
Individual, ad hoc 
projects; little 
emphasis on in­
terrelationships 
Adequate 
Considerable 
Considerable 
and rising 
Considerable 
and increasing 
reliance on 
memory declin­
ing 
Many; number 
increasing 
Organizes market towns No 
Yes 
Systems and net­
works ; inter­
relationships 
emphasized 
Yes 
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Table 1. (Continued) 
Dual Modernizing 
Investment in infra­
structure (electri­
city, transport, 
storage, land im­
provement) 
National systems 
Regional systems 
Local systems 
Build linkages be­
tween national, 
regional, and local 
levels 
Adequate 
Tends to be ade­
quate 
Inadequate ; often 
no network 
Unsystematic and 
slow 
Adequate 
Adequate 
Adequate, built 
as networks 
Essentially 
systematic and 
rapid 
Policy, Attitudes, Trends 
Related to Production 
System 
Government believes the 
poor can pay cost of 
own improvement 
Price system 
"Efficiency" generally 
equated with "big­
ness" and the 
"latest machines" 
Subsidized capital 
investment (which 
benefits mostly 
the rich) 
Geographic dispersion 
of industry 
Systematic extension 
of the financial 
system to local 
level 
Support of small 
producers 
No 
Substantial ad­
ministrative 
controls 
Yes 
Considerable 
Some 
No 
Little 
Yes 
Strong reliance 
on "the mar­
ket" 
No 
Little 
Considerable 
Yes 
Much 
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Table 1. (Continued) 
Dual Modernizing 
Number of investors 
Income distribution 
Un- and underemploy­
ment 
Tenancy and/or land 
reform 
Agricultural taxa­
tion (land in­
comes) 
Education 
Rely on formal edu­
cation systems 
Willingness to in­
troduce variety 
of "non-formal" 
education pro­
grams 
"The Population Ex-
M  i  *  I I  plosion 
Birth rates 
Exports (Per Capita) 
Few; increasing 
slowly 
Inequality in­
creasing 
Rising 
Lip service ; lax 
enforcement 
Low 
Yes 
Little 
High and essen­
tially static 
Rising slowly, 
static, or 
falling 
Few in the be­
ginning ; ris­
ing rapidly 
Inequality de­
creasing 
Falling 
Enforced 
Generally high 
Yes 
Much 
Falling 
Rising rapidly 
Contrary to Owens and Shaw's emphasis on the industrial 
sector, Chodak (1973) claimed that LDC's usually modernize 
without industrialization. Industrialization was not the 
primary instigator of modernization. Chodak stated: 
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"African and Asian nations usually begin the process of moderni­
zation with nation-building and the elevation of modem politi­
cal systems" (p. 259). In Chodak's opinion, the goals of LDC 
modernization were a change in the social structure toward the 
acceptance of new norms and values, and the spread of an educa­
ted society. These changes might make the introduction of 
industrialization much easier, Chodak continued, but it some­
times did not since it was not a primary goal of the moderniza­
tion process. 
Lele (1975) undertook the study of 17 rural development 
projects in seven African countries. The magnitude of the 
study allowed Lele to "draw upon comprehensive evidence devel­
oped from a diverse set of experiences in order to examine some 
of the most important policy and institutional issues of de­
velopment faced by national governments and donor agencies" 
(p. xi). Lele continued by stating that the analysis of the 
projects under study had to go far beyond formal analytical 
steps to fully understand the "administrative, technological, 
sociopolitical, and environmental factors that influence the 
quality of rural planning and that often explain the ineffec­
tiveness of its implementation at the micro level" (p. xi). 
Further Lele felt that the importance of the study was not that 
it could propose a set of definitive solutions for rural de­
velopment, but that it promoted an understanding of the diver­
sity and complexity of the constraints and potentials of rural 
areas. 
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Among Lele's conclusions were the following statements: 
Their limited effectiveness cannot be attributed to 
the inadequate or inappropriate specification of 
target groups but rather to a combination of factors. 
First, the objectives of rural development have 
changed considerably over time. The projects were 
also based on more limited knowledge than is now 
available of broader sector and policy questions and 
of their possible impact on the performance of the 
individual programs. Frequently, . . . national 
policies could not be changed to improve project per­
formance. The programs were often based on inade­
quate knowledge of technological possibilities and 
of their suitability to small-farm conditions. Ex­
perience with regard to the appropriate forms of 
administrative institutions and their transferability 
was limited when many of these programs were planned. 
They also suffered from poor knowledge of the 
sociocultural and institutional environment in which 
they were to be implemented. Consequently, the pro­
grams were rarely designed with a view to anticipate 
the effect of sociopolitical factors on the response 
to interventions or with an intention to introduce 
modifications in plans in the course of implementa­
tion to achieve maximum effectiveness. Finally, and 
most importantly, the programs often experienced ex­
treme scarcity of trained manpower, (p. 176) 
Regarding the implications her findings had on future 
rural development projects, Lele noted that if the primary 
objective of the project was to aid the lowest income groups 
then it was important that the existing sectoral policies and 
involved institutions be explicitly oriented toward these 
groups. Lele also stated that more substantive planning was 
necessary for future rural development projects to be success­
ful. Questions must be asked and answered regarding the pro­
fitability of new technologies; the effectiveness of local 
markets ; the consequences of a new marketing scheme on exist­
ing social ties; the identification of the true constraints to 
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development; the feasibility of removing the constraints given 
the existing manpower and institutional development; and the 
time required to accomplish the tasks undertaken. 
Lele recommended that future rural development projects 
begin by making only a few small changes aimed at the more 
critical constraints. This would allow the project to evolve 
slowly, at a more normal pace. Lele concluded by stating that, 
"Program evolution ought to be based on the specific knowledge 
acquired; the constraints identified; and the indigenous human, 
institutional, and financial capability developed during the 
course of earlier stages of program implementation" (p. 178). 
Svennilson (1967) condensed the required ingredients for 
successful development into three general categories where 
change must occur: 
a. social systems and human attitudes; 
b. knowledge and human skills; 
c. the physical implements in which modem tech­
nology is embodied, (p. 176) 
Svennilson also listed five features of successful tech­
nology transfer; The transfer activity was a joint venture 
between the donor country and the recipient country; the trans­
fer activity was conducted by a team of specialists; emphasis 
was placed on learning by doing; social and attitudinal changes 
occurred regarding the concepts of work, technology, education, 
and training; and adequate and reliable management and leader­
ship was available. 
Unsuccessful development was explained by Svennilson as 
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the occurrence of bottlenecks in the development process. 
Examples of these bottlenecks included equipment not being 
available when required; necessary inputs were available but 
human attitudes and social systems were opposed to the new 
innovations; the population was adequately educated and all the 
inputs were available, but managerial skills were lacking. 
Development planning advocated by the International Labour 
Office (1977) emphasized the need for providing everyone with 
an absolute level of basic needs. Two basic needs were de­
fined by the International Labour Office (ILO). 
First, they include a certain minimum requirement of 
a family for private consumption: adequate food, 
shelter and clothing are obviously included, as 
would be certain household equipment and furniture. 
Second, they include essential services provided by 
and for the community such as safe drinking water, 
sanitation, public transport, and health and educa­
tional facilities, (p. 33) 
The ILO also emphasized that a basic needs development 
program would have to include the participation of the people 
in the decision-making processes involved in the program. The 
integrated ILO theory was that education and health facilitate 
participation, and participation ensured the acquisition of 
basic needs; while employment was both a means and an end 
within the overall development scheme. 
Regarding integrated rural development projects, Norman 
(1974) noted that the implementation of such projects required 
the involvement of many disciplines. In addition, Norman 
stated that the knowledge required to solve many development 
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problems was found by perusing many different disciplines. 
These two situations, then, resulted in various disciplines 
having a symbiotic relationship with each other, which, in 
turn, required that many disciplines were forced to give up 
isolated research and to begin working in cooperation with 
other disciplines. 
According to Norman, 
There is a move away from a multi-disciplinary ap­
proach (which implies researchers from more than one 
discipline who do not necessarily communicate with 
one another) to that involving an inter-disciplinary 
emphasis (which implies greater integration of dis­
ciplines through joint projects), (p. 6) 
Foster-Carter (1976), like Kunkel, also spoke of para­
digms, not one expressly for psychological analysis of de­
velopment, but "a new paradigm" which development analysts 
were beginning to apply to various projects. According to 
Foster-Carter, the new paradigm emphasized the interrelation­
ships of development and underdevelopment and between tradi­
tional and modem systems. Foster-Carter also claimed that the 
new paradigm would identify conflicts of interests (between 
nations, between social classes), place emphasis on historical 
factors, recognize various economic structures, view develop­
ment as a revolution as opposed to an evolution, and promote 
socialism. 
Schramm's (1964) major thoughts on development emphasized 
a specific discipline. However, with the exception of 
Bordenave, Schramm was the only development expert who placed 
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a strong emphasis on communication. Schramm (1964) attacked 
the concept of having industrialization as the central focus of 
development planning. According to his thesis, not only was 
this concept a poor one because it benefitted only a small 
segment of the population, but also because the areas of agri­
culture, social overhead, and human resources had to be de­
veloped also if any real gain were to be realized in the in­
dustrial sector. In Schramm's view, all four of these factors 
must be developed simultaneously, and that it didn't really 
matter which one or ones were the prime movers—"The point is 
that they must go forward together" (p. 25). 
Schramm's book, however, focused on the role of communica­
tions and mass media in the interdisciplinary development pro­
cess. Schramm recommended 15 activities that developers and 
LDC's could do to aid in the development process. They were as 
follows : 
1. A developing country should examine the flow of 
development information within its borders. 
2. A developing country should examine the use it is 
making of the mass media in multiplying the flow 
of information on development. 
3. To the extent that planning is possible, a de­
veloping country should plan a balanced and 
measured growth for its mass media, with a view 
to relationships among the media and to those be­
tween the media and other aspects of development. 
4. A developing country (and its friends and aiders) 
should not hesitate to invest in a well-considered 
program of mass media development and use. 
5. A developing country should try to establish a 
cooperative relationship between the organs of 
government responsible for its mass media develop­
ment and those responsible for education and other 
related developments. 
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6. A developing country should take steps to facili­
tate the circulation of news. 
7. A developing country should try to make it as 
easy as possible to establish and maintain "local 
media." 
8. A developing country should give special attention 
to combining mass media with interpersonal com­
munication. 
9. A developing country should review its restric­
tions on the importing of informational materials. 
10. A developing country should consider the possi­
bility of establishing communication industries. 
11. A developing country should provide adequate 
training for its information personnel. 
12. A developing country should seek as much feedback 
as possible from its mass media audiences. 
13. A developing country should draw up a special 
statute of information at the same time that it 
draws up a plan for economic and social develop­
ment, and the statute should be adapted, through 
successive revisions, to the successive phases 
of national development. 
14. A developing country should not hesitate to make 
use of new technical developments in communication, 
in cases where these new developments fit its 
needs and capabilities. 
15. Countries should share their experience in using 
the mass media and other information channels to 
speed economic development and social change, 
(pp. 253-269) 
Summary 
The review of literature was conducted to discern the 
various approaches to interdisciplinary development that had 
been advocated by persons concerned with LDC development and 
its planning. The review revealed that the call for an inter­
disciplinary approach to development had been made as early as 
1958. However, although the interdisciplinary approaches put 
forth by development experts since 1958 were many and varied, 
most still emphasized a particular dimension of development. 
For example, development experts who placed an emphasis on the 
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socio-cultural aspects of an interdisciplinary approach to de­
velopment included Geiger and Geiger, Mboya, Moore, Mountjoy, 
Neihoff and Anderson, and Saxena. That the economic aspects of 
development had been overemphasized was the primary message put 
forth by Geiger, Hirschman, Taake, and Wilkinson. 
Long, Schumacher, Seers, and Wignaraja placed a major em­
phasis of their writings on the educational aspects of develop­
ment. The political dimension of development was the focal 
point of the interdisciplinary approach advocated by Eastman 
and Ruttan, while Kunkel, Mason, McClelland, and Papanek 
focused on the psychological dimensions of an interdisciplinary 
approach to development. 
Those development experts who placed an emphasis on the 
technical aspects of an interdisciplinary approach to develop­
ment included the Canadian Hunger Foundation, Clay, Gotsch, 
Haseyama, Jacoby, Mellor, Stevens and Ahmad, and Vietorisz. 
Among the authors whose approach to interdisciplinary develop­
ment did not emphasize a specific discipline were Chodak, 
Foster-Carter, the International Labour Office, Lele, Norman, 
Owens and Shaw, and Svennilson. 
The above reviews, analyses, theories, plans, and re­
search findings related to an interdisciplinary approach to de­
velopment were extracted from a variety of development-oriented 
journals, periodicals, reports, and books. Despite the re­
peated call for nearly 20 years for an interdisciplinary ap­
proach to development, the vast majority of the writings con-
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tained in the publications perused described single discipline 
approaches to development. 
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CHAPTER III. CASE STUDIES 
This chapter contains the case studies of the two Pakistani 
rural development projects compared in Chapter 4: The Khanewal 
Rural Development Project undertaken in 1962, located in the 
Punjab Region of the former Province of West Pakistan (now 
Pakistan); the Comilla Rural Development Project undertaken in 
1959, located in the Comilla District of the former province of 
East Pakistan (now Bangladesh). 
Introduction 
Pakistan became a nation on August 14, 1947. With its 
independence from England and separation from India, came a 
period of mass migration of Muslims from India into Pakistan and 
a reverse flow of Hindus from Pakistan into India. Despite the 
best efforts of government officials on both sides of the 
border, these mass migrations resulted in mass rioting and 
looting, mass panic, mass execution, and unimaginable bloodshed 
whenever waves of refugees met each other head on. 
The country was in a state of unparalleled confusion. 
Land with crops almost ready to harvest was abandoned; whole 
villages and even cities were found totally abandoned. Con­
trasting this abandonment and emptiness were the hoards of 
landless, possessionless immigrants with no place to go. 
Three years later, in 1950, when Karl Knaus became the 
first extension advisor from the Foreign Agricultural Service, 
U.S. Department of Agriculture, to enter Pakistan, things were 
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not much improved. The bloodshed had ended, at least for the 
time being, but the nation still was in its infant stage of 
independent rule. 
Knaus (1953) described the situation in the following 
manner : 
Pakistan had no established National Capital; very 
little industry or raw materials for industry other 
than agricultural products; and few developed re­
sources such as fuel, forests, and minerals. Abun­
dant water power in the north was undeveloped. There 
was little organized international trade; inadequate 
agricultural credit facilities; inadequate marketing 
facilities .... Irrigation is well developed, but 
there are tremendous problems of water supply, 
drainage, water logging and salt accumulation. Agri­
culture is the principal industry and engages over 
85% of the people. 
Of the several agricultural colleges in old India, 
only one of recognized standing was within the bor­
ders of Pakistan. The Punjab Agricultural College at 
Lyallpur was well established and well managed .... 
A limited amount of agricultural training was offered 
at Islamia College in Peshawar, Northwest Frontier 
Province. Farmers and professionally trained people 
who work in rural areas have very low status, (p. 1) 
Knaus' job in Pakistan was to supervise the development of an 
agricultural extension service. The purpose of the extension 
service was "to teach the masses of the people with the known 
solutions of their problems of production, marketing and 
living standards, and encourage efforts of self-help" (Knaus, 
p. 31). It was assumed that this extension service would 
ultimately lead to the creation of an agricultural sector that 
would provide food and fibre to feed and clothe the nation's 
rapidly increasing population; provide a surplus of food and 
fibre for export to maintain a favorable balance of foreign 
62 
exchange and revenue from export and import taxes ; improve the 
natural soil and water resources; and develop a national 
awareness of the importance of agriculture. 
To make the extension service an effective force in the 
agricultural sector of Pakistan, Knaus felt that an adequate 
base of scientific knowledge was required. Therefore, he 
recommended that priority be given to enlarging and improving 
the agricultural colleges. Knaus also realized that a method 
had to be found for acquiring the participation of the people, 
thus he strongly urged that an effective practical program be 
established. Knaus suggested that this program have a coopera­
tive -type organization, that it keep its administration close 
to the people, and that a committee of local volunteer leaders 
be allowed to determine program priorities for their area. In 
addition, Knaus stated that adequate supplies of materials were 
required, as were a sufficient number of trained personnel 
knowledgeable in the new agricultural technologies. 
The new agricultural extension service had barely begun, 
however, when in 1952-1953, West Pakistan suffered from one of 
the lowest wheat harvests in the history of the Asian sub­
continent. A severe drought which resulted in extremely low 
river levels and a shortage of water in irrigation canals, a 
diversion of land and water to cash crops, insect attacks, and 
the uncertainties of still unsettled land reform all con­
tributed to the disaster. The wheat harvest for that period 
was 2,285,000 tons lower than the 1950-1951 harvest. This 
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tremendous shortage of wheat necessitated the importing of 
1,637,300 tons of foodgrains, including almost 900,000 tons of 
wheat. The vast majority of these foodgrains came from 
Australia, Canada, and the United States (Ministry of Food and 
Agriculture, 1955). 
This combined natural and man-made disaster did result in 
one positive side effect. It stimulated a new effort at 
planned economic development in Pakistan. In 1953, Pakistani 
economists, aided by expertise from the United Nations, the 
Food and Agriculture Organization, the Agency for International 
Development, and several advisory groups including Harvard 
University, undertook to establish a new economic plan for 
Pakistan. The outcome was the First Five-Year Plan (1955-
1960), which was followed subsequently by the Second, Third, 
and Fourth Five-Year Plans covering the years 1960-1965, 1965-
1970, and 1970-1975 (Nyrop et al. 1971). 
Pakistan's First Five-Year Plan represented the country's 
first attempt to coordinate both the private and public sec­
tors' development investments. Investment in the plan totaled 
Rs. 10.8 billion, of which Rs. 7.5 billion came from the public 
sector. Rs. 3.3 billion came from the private sector. (Fig­
ures for the First and Second Five-Year Plans represent in­
vestment totals for both East and West Pakistan.) 
Industry received the largest percentage of the invested 
moneys from the First Five-Year Plan, 26.7%. It was followed 
by water and power, 21.3%; transport and communications, 16.7%; 
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physical planning and housing, 13.1%; and agriculture 9.5% 
(see Table 2). However, because much of the investment in the 
water and power area went for irrigation as opposed to indus­
trial projects, agriculture's share was actually much greater 
than 9.5%. 
The goals of the First Five-Year Plan included an increase 
of 15% in the GNP and an increase of 7% in per capita income. 
The actual outcome of the Plan was an 11% increase in the GNP, 
and a decline in the per capita income because the population 
increased 12% instead of the estimated 8%. 
The expenditures for the Second Five-Year Plan, 1960-1965, 
more than doubled the expenditures of the First Plan (see 
Table 3). Total expenditures were Rs. 23 billion, with Rs. 
14.6 billion coming from the public sector and Rs. 8.4 billion 
coming from the private sector. Industry's share of the total 
expenditures dropped to 22.3%, although it still retained the 
largest share. Agriculture jumped to 14.9%, while still bene­
fitting from much of the allocation to water and power. 
Most of the goals of the Second Five-Year Plan were met or 
surpassed. For example, the GNP increased 30% as opposed to 
the goal of 24%, and agriculture had a 3.4% annual increase 
as opposed to a 1.3% increase for the previous ten years. 
In the Third Five-Year Plan (1965-1970) West Pakistan's 
share of the investments, Rs. 25 billion, was greater than 
the total planned investment of the Second Plan. Total planned 
investment for the Third Plan was Rs. 52 billion, with Rs. 30 
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Table 2. First Five-Year Plan by sectors and spending units, 
1955-1960 in billion rupees (1957 value; 1 rupee = 
U.S. $0.21)2 
Sector Public Private Total Percent of Total Expenditure 
Agriculture 1.207 —  —  1.207 9.5 
Water and Power 2.697 - — 2.697 21.3 
Industry 1.622 1.750 3.372 26.7 
Fuels and Minerals — — —  —  —  —  
Transport and 
Communications 1.666 .450 2.116 16.7 
Physical Planning 
and Housing .861 .800 1.661 13.1 
Education .580 -  —  .580 4.6 
Health .288 —  —  .288 2.3 
Social Welfare .133 —  —  .133 1.0 
Manpower Works 
Program .298 —  - .298 2.4 
Miscellaneous -  —  .300 .300 2.4 
Total 9.352 3.300 12.652 100.0 
Less Shortfall 1.850 —  —  1.850 — —  
Net Total 7.502 3.300 10.802 —  —  
A^dapted from Nyrop et al. (1971, p. 338) 
billion coming from the public sector and Rs, 22 billion 
coming from the private sector. Industry's share remained at 
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Table 3. Second Five-Year Plan by sectors and spending units, 
1960-1965 in billion ruoees (1962 value: 1 rupee = 
U.S. $0.21)3 
Sector Public Private Total Percent of Total Expenditure 
Agriculture 2.515 .905 3.420 14.9 
Water and Power 4.140 .250 4.390 19.1 
Industry 1.460 3.3660 5.120 22.3 
Fuels and Minerals .450 .550 1.000 4.3 
Transport and 
Communications 2.725 1.325 4.050 17.6 
Physical Planning 
and Housing 1.885 1.525 3.410 14.8 
Education .950 .100 1.050 4.6 
Health .370 .050 .420 1.8 
Social Welfare .125 .015 .140 0.6 
Manpower Works 
Program — — - - — — - — 
Miscellaneous — — - - — — — — 
Total 14.620 8.330 23.000 100.0 
Less Shortfall — — - — - - - -
Net Total 14.620 8.330 23.000 - -
A^dapted from Nyrop et al. (1971, p. 338) 
22.3%, transport and coramunications rose to 20%, and agri­
culture increased slightly to 15.3%, while water and power's 
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share declines to 16.4% (see Table 4). 
Because of the success of the Second Plan, the goals for 
the Third Plan were very ambitious. They included a 35% in­
crease in the GNP, an average annual per capita income increase 
of 3.8%, and a 5% increase in agricultural production. Due, 
however, to a decrease in foreign aid and foreign investment, 
hostilities with India which increased defense spending, and 
bad weather which resulted in poor harvests, Pakistan was 
forced to revise the Third Plan in 1967. Defense, an agricul­
tural self-sufficiency program, and basic industries were con­
sidered top priorities, while industries, relying on imported 
raw materials and parts, languished. Consequently, public 
sector investment fell 25% short of its expectations and the 
annual growth rate increased 5.7%, compared to a goal of 6.5%. 
As it headed into the period of the Fourth Five-Year 
Plan, 1970-1975, Pakistan could look back upon an 
extended experience of exceptional achievement. 
It also, however, had to look forward to a formidable 
array of economic problems in agriculture, 
industry, and the balance of payments. In agri­
culture the main problems were land tenure, farm-to-
market communications and marketing, and rural 
credit. (Nyrop et al., 1971, p. 345) 
The Fourth Five-Year Plan called for a total investment 
from the public and private sectors of some Rs. 75 billion. 
Implementation of the Fourth Plan had barely begun when, in 
1971, the country was wracked with internal political turmoil 
which led eventually to a revolution, civil war, and the former 
provinces of East and West Pakistan becoming the independent 
nations of Bangladesh and Pakistan respectively. 
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Table 4. Third Five-Year Plan by sectors and spending units, 
West Pakistan, 1965-1970 in billion rupees (1967 
value: 1 rupee = U.S. $0,21)^  
Sector Public Private Total Percent of Total Expenditure 
Agriculture 1.816 1.900 3.716 15.3 
Water and Power 4.387 .550 4.937 16.4 
Industry 1.081 4.500 5.581 22.3 
Fuels and Minerals .267 .450 .717 2.5 
Transport and 
Communications 3.431 1.800 5.231 20.0 
Physical Planning 
and Housing 1.113 1.650 2.763 12.2 
Education 1.066 .100 1.166 5.1 
Health .544 .020 .564 2.3 
Social Welfare .040 .020 .060 0.3 
Manpower Works 
Program .035 .010 .045 0.2 
Miscellaneous .620 — — .620 3.4 
Total 14.400 11.000 25.400 100.00 
Less Expected 
Shortfall .400 — — .400 — — 
Net Total 14.000 11.000 25.000 — — 
A^dapted from Nyrop et al. (1971, p. 338) 
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West Pakistan Rural Development 
Introduction 
West Pakistan's economy was overwhelmingly dependent upon 
agriculture. More than 45% of the provincial income was de­
rived from agriculture, which included animal husbandry, 
forestry, and fisheries; approximately 60% of the workforce 
was employed in agriculture; virtually all of West Pakistan's 
exports were agriculture related; most of the country's ex­
panding industries were dependent upon agriculture; and much of 
the Government's revenue was derived from taxes on land under 
cultivation and the products produced on that land (Nyrop et al.) 
Approximately 1/4 of West Pakistan or about 47 million 
acres were under cultivation. Much of this cultivable land 
was located in the Indus Valley, and more than 1/2 of it was 
irrigated. The major crops grown in West Pakistan were wheat, 
cotton, rice, millet, sugar cane, and tobacco. From 75% to 
80% of the land under cultivation was devoted to growing food 
grains. 
Despite the dominance of agriculture interests, the agri­
cultural sector was not without its problems. Nyrop, when 
describing the situation as late as 1971, stated: 
Agricultural development lags behind the rest of the 
economy . . . and the yields per acre are among the 
lowest in the world. Quick profits to be made 
through commercial and industrial investments have 
tended to attract capital away from agricultural 
development. Agricultural holdings are often frag­
mented into uneconomic plots, and many agricultural 
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techniques remain primitive. Although improvements 
have been and are being made, plant and animal dis­
eases are extensive, supply and marketing facilities 
are rudimentary, and credit facilities are inade­
quate. (p. 347) 
Salinity and waterlogging, resulting from many years of 
flood irrigating, were major specific problems in many areas 
of West Pakistan, as was an inadequate supply of chemical 
fertilizers. It had been demonstrated that the proper amount 
of chemical fertilizer, coupled with sufficient irrigation 
water, could almost triple the yield per acre of many grain 
crops grown in West Pakistan. Farm mechanization had begun to 
add to the underemployment and unemployment problems in rural 
areas initiated by the small uneconomic family plots. Finally, 
perhaps the greatest problem was that the major technological 
innovations implemented in the agricultural sector had not 
benefitted the majority of the farmers, the masses of peasant 
farmers who lived at the subsistence level. Indeed, they 
seemingly were worse off than they were prior to the influx of 
the technologies. Almost all of the benefits seemed to have 
been reaped by a very narrow segment of West Pakistan's 
society—the bigger landowners, the money lenders, and the 
urban investors (Nulty, 1972). 
The agrarian reform of West Pakistan included the forma­
tion of cooperatives as a means of ensuring the peasant farmer 
a share in the benefits received from the modernization of the 
agricultural sector. As already indicated, however, the 
masses of small farmers had not benefitted from the new tech­
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nologies; many were still living at the subsistence level. 
The Cooperative Systems 
West Pakistan cooperatives were originally organized under 
the Cooperative Credit Societies Act of 1904. Their major 
function until the 1950's was to supply credit to the agri­
cultural sector of the country. However, in practice, the 
cooperative societies "tended to be composed of reasonably 
well-to-do persons, many of them not farmers, and . . . loans 
were often spent for weddings or other ceremonies rather than 
for agricultural practices" (Nyrop, et al., 1971, p. 376). 
In the early 1950's when much of the country was still 
unsettled, with many refugees still homeless and landless, a 
large reclamation and colonization project was begun in the 
desert regions of Western Punjab. One million two hundred 
thousand acres of land were to be reclaimed. Roads and irri­
gation canals were constructed and villages built. The pur­
poses of the project were to resettle the refugees and make 
them not only self-sufficient, but actual contributors to the 
agricultural production of the country. 
Each refugee family head was given 12 1/2 acres of land 
to cultivate, with the following restrictions: 
1. He must become a member of the cooperative system. 
2. He must live within the village confines. 
3. He would pay for the land, house, and common village 
buildings by contributing a set portion of his crop to the 
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cooperative each year for 15 years. 
4. He could not divide the land among his progeny; it 
must remain intact. 
5. He could not sell the land since title remained with 
the Pakistan government. 
The villages had provisions "for a school, a health cen­
ter, a mosque, a public assembly hall, grain storage, police 
station, bazaars, vegetable gardens, and a common pasture of 
40 acres" (Knaus, 1953, p. 14). The cooperative system was 
also to provide the villager with seed, fertilizer, water, 
sprays, credit, and all the necessities for growing his crops. 
It was assumed that because these items could be purchased or 
provided on a large scale, the farmer would save money and be 
able to secure the necessary items when needed. It was also 
planned that the cooperative system would buy the farmer's 
products directly, store them in godowns, and then resell the 
grain and fibre sporadically over the entire year. Thus, 
through the law of supply and demand, the cooperative would 
create a stable market and a higher return for the individual 
farmer. 
The cooperatives, managed by government civil servants, 
were also responsible for providing the refugees with new 
technological developments in agriculture. This point caused 
considerable confusion and conflict with the extension service, 
whose responsibility was also to provide farmers with new 
developments. During this same time period, Pakistan joined 
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the Green Revolution, by introducing the "package system" for 
improving crop production. The "package" consisted of new 
short varieties of miracle wheat developed in Mexico, proper 
cultivation practices, increased fertilizer, and sufficient 
irrigation water. This package, when applied correctly, would 
more than double the per acre production. 
The Khanewal Project 
The Khanewal Project was that portion of the previously 
mentioned large land reclamation and colonization project 
undertaken in the early 1950's in the Western Punjab that came 
under the auspices of the Colony Cooperative Farming Union 
(CCFU). The headquarters of the CCFU was located in the town 
of Khanewal, hence, the name of the project. 
The Khanewal Project was a multi-faceted rural development 
project designed to aid the former refugees in the areas of 
crop production, animal husbandry, farm mechanization, health 
and nutrition, and community development. Although multi-
faceted, the Khanewal Project was not integrated, that is, 
there was no one overall development scheme for the entire 
area. Instead, each technical area was free to develop and 
implement its own programs. This lack of coordination was 
further complicated by the fact that personnel from the Basic 
Democracies (a national community development program), civil 
servants representing the CCFU, U.S. Peace Corps Volunteers, 
and local leaders all had similar, overlapping projects in 
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each of the technical areas. 
During the late 1950's, the neglect of the agriculture 
sector, a rapidly expanding population, and nature in the form 
of a drought, combined to cause serious food shortages in 
Pakistan. As a means to alleviate this problem, Pakistani 
development planners in the early I960's suggested that the 
wheat production in the Punjab region could be significantly 
increased if the preparation and cultivation of the land were 
mechanized. The Punjab was the logical area for this emphasis 
because it was the breadbasket of West Pakistan (see Table 5). 
The development planners used the following reasons for 
suggesting the mechanization of the agriculture of the Punjab. 
First, the farmers were leveling and cultivating their land by 
using primitive devices pulled by water buffalo or oxen. 
Since each farmer had his own animal, from 1/3 to 1/2 of the 
total land under cultivation had to be used for pasture and 
fodder crops for the animals. The introduction of tractors to 
prepare and cultivate the land would mean that the farmers 
would no longer need their buffalo, and therefore, significant 
amounts of land would be freed for the production of wheat. 
Secondly, the primitive plow being used by the farmers of 
the Punjab, literally a wooden stick, did little more than 
scratch the surface of the land. The soil in this part of 
Pakistan had a heavy clay base and, as a result, dried brick-
hard in the sun. Even when plowed wet, the land was rarely 
penetrated more than a few inches. Consequently, when the 
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Table 5. Estimated production of major crops in Pakistan and 
the Punjab (1973-1974)* 
Million Tons 
Pakistan Punjab Punj ab's Percentage Share 
Wheat 7.32^  5.60% 76.5 
Cotton (million bales) 3.70 2.53 68.4 
Sugarcane 22.00 16.36 74.4 
Rice 
Fine (basmati) 0.47 0.47 100.0 
Medium and Coarse 1.94 0.62 32.0 
Maize 0.76 0.33 43.4 
Gram 0.55 0.39 70.9 
Rape and Mustard 0.31 0.18 58.1 
A^dapted from Planning and Development Board-, Government 
of the Punjab (1974, p. 7) 
A^ctual for 1972-73 
crop was flood-irrigated, the majority of the water simply 
evaporated instead of soaking into the ground. It was rea­
soned that steel tractor-drawn plows would be able to pene­
trate the soil deep enough to allow the soil to absorb a 
significantly larger amount of the scarce water. 
Third, research being conducted in the reclamation of 
land lost to salinity, indicated that the salts could be 
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leached out through a combination of heavy irrigation and 
numerous deep plowings. Since soil salinity was an in­
creasingly important problem in the Punjab, it was antici­
pated that the tractors could be used in the off season in 
land reclamation projects. 
Fourth, high-yielding, short stem varieties of wheat 
were being introduced into the Punjab. It was found that 
these new varieties were vulnerable in improperly prepared 
land; the fields that were shallow-plowed prior to seeding 
would yield harvests far below those that were deep-plowed 
prior to seeding. Hence, the need for tractors. 
The CCFU Farm Mechanization Project 
As a pilot project, the Government of Pakistan purchased 
50 John Deere Lantz diesel engine farm tractors from Germany 
and 50 International Harvester diesel engine farm tractors 
from England. The tractors and accompanying implements were 
distributed throughout the Punjab region under the auspices 
of the CCFU. Selected cooperative-member villages were sent 
one or two tractors, depending upon the size of the village, 
to replace the buffalo or oxen when cultivating and preparing 
the land. The villages differed in the number of farmers, 
but each farmer had only the 12 1/2 acres given to him by the 
Government when he had migrated from India after Partition in 
1947. 
There were several substantial and documented reasons 
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for introducing farm tractors to this particular part of the 
country. There was even an already well-established infra­
structure, the cooperative union, to disperse the tractors 
and to eventually collect payments. However, the tractors 
were not well received by the villagers in the first place, 
and when the planning faults became evident, the project began 
to falter. 
One reason why the tractors were not well received was 
because the villagers were never involved in the planning. 
In fact, those that received the tractors had no recourse; 
they weren't asked if they wanted them; they were told they 
had to take them. If the villagers had been consulted, the 
planners might have learned, for example, that the farmers 
had no intention of giving up their water buffalo, tractor or 
no tractor, because the buffalo performed many other services 
besides being a draft animal. The buffalo's milk was a sub­
stantial and important part of their diet, its dung when dried 
served as fuel for cooking fires, it served as a pack animal 
and as a means of transportation when necessary, and even in 
death the buffalo provided the farmer with meat and a hide 
that he could either use himself or sell. 
The planners would also have discovered that the farmers 
were only a few years short of becoming free of their debt on 
the land. When the tractors and their payments were forced 
upon them, the villagers saw this as simply a way for the 
cooperative to extend its control for another extended period. 
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Over the years, the villagers had become disillusioned with 
the CCFU, seeing it only as a political and financial burden 
contributing little to their well-being, and were looking for­
ward to having at least financial freedom. The tractor 
scheme, of course, eliminated this possibility, and as a 
result, the tractors were not welcome in most villages. 
The farmers also saw the tractors as a weapon used by 
the cooperative union to accelerate the introduction of an­
other technological innovation they were not particularly 
fond of—the short stemmed varieties of wheat. Even though 
yields increased dramatically, the negative aspects of the 
new wheat varieties outweighed the increased yields in the 
minds of many farmers. For example, the wheat was much harder 
than the local varieties and therefore more difficult to 
grind; the resultant flour did not have the right consistency 
to form good chupattis, a wheat cake that was the major part 
of a rural Pakistani's diet, and even the color of the flour 
was not appealing. In addition, the new varieties required 
more fertilizers and irrigation water, which increased the 
investment in the crop to the point where the increased yield 
barely covered the added expense. The tractors added yet an­
other unwanted, and in the farmers' opinion, unwarranted ex­
pense . 
Finally, the farmers did not like the new wheat varieties 
because they were short stemmed. Local wheats had been 
specifically chosen because they were long stemmed. The 
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farmers felt they were getting two crops for the price of one 
if they grew long stemmed wheat—the grain, of course, they 
used themselves, and the stems they used for feeding their 
animals. With the length of the stem reduced to less than 
half the size of their local wheats, the farmers saw a drastic 
reduction in the size of their fodder crop. In the eyes of 
the farmer, then, the short stemmed varieties of wheat were 
forcing them to take a great financial risk by increasing 
their initial investment, to produce a crop they didn't like 
as well, and to actually reduce an important secondary crop. 
And the tractors were the key element in this enterprise. 
No attempt was made to inform the villagers of the 
positive potential of the tractors, or to educate them, at 
least to a basic understanding, of things mechanical. Thus, 
when the farmers did attempt to use the tractors (regardless 
of their opposition, they couldn't afford not to use them), 
this lack of technical knowledge became apparent. The 
tractors were not in the fields long before the following 
flaws in the project were recognized: 
1. The tractor drivers the CCFU assigned to each 
tractor were uniformly unskilled in proper cultivation and 
tractor maintenance procedures. 
2. The implements which accompanied the tractors were not 
suitable for working quarter-acre plots of land, the way the 
Punjabi farmers divided their land for irrigation purposes. 
3. The closest fuel supply was from 20 to 40 miles away. 
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4. There were no repair shops, trained mechanics, or 
tools and equipment to do major or even much minor repair work. 
5. The farmers believed that the plowing had to be done 
during a specific period of time, which proved to be too short 
to plow every farmer's land. 
The last flaw caused a great deal of dissension among 
the farmers as to who was to get his land plowed first. The 
first four flaws, however, proved to be more critical to the 
project. One, or a combination of these flaws, resulted in 
nearly 90% of the tractors being in a state of disrepair 
within the first six months of operation. Some tractors were 
just out of fuel; others had minor mechanical problems such as 
dead batteries or flat tires; but some, perhaps 20%, already 
needed major mechanical repair, a condition caused by a com­
bination of lack of maintenance, improper use, and the natural 
phenomena of intense heat and extremely dusty conditions. 
The famers were now faced with the choice of not re­
pairing the tractors but still being forced to pay for them 
with absolutely no return, or taking on the added expense of 
having them repaired, meeting the further expense of keeping 
them properly maintained, and paying them off. The decision 
wasn't very difficult for many farmers. Why add more money 
to that already wasted, especially when they probably would 
not be able to receive any benefits anyway? Most farmers 
decided they wanted nothing further to do with the tractors 
and petitioned the CCFU to remove them from their village. 
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Instead, the Cooperative Union attempted to correct some 
of the flaws. They hired mechanics to begin repairing the 
tractors; they contracted for a centrally located fuel dump; 
since most parts were available in the larger cities, they 
began to build several centrally located workshops; they re­
called the drivers for a short but intensive training session 
in periodic maintenance procedures and proper cultivation 
practices; they set up a monthly maintenance check in which 
the driver would be fined if the vehicle was not properly 
cared for; and they modified the implements for use in small 
areas. 
But all this took a great deal of time and money. All 
the villagers saw was an increasing financial burden with no 
real return. Their request to have the tractors withdrawn 
was ignored. Consequently, the tractors and everyone asso­
ciated with them were met with increased hostility; some 
farmers refused to use the tractors, while others continued 
to use them only under duress. 
In the midst of all of this turmoil and conflict, the 
Government of Pakistan announced that another group of 50 
International Harvester tractors had been ordered and were to 
arrive shortly. In an attempt to eliminate at least one area 
of inadequate preparation, the technicians responsible for 
integrating the tractors into the cooperative system, sug­
gested to the CCFU that training sessions for the new drivers 
be initiated immediately. They claimed that such training 
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would produce drivers well trained in the operation, care, and 
maintenance of the tractors, and help to eliminate major 
sources of tractor "down time," time when the tractor was in 
a state of disrepair. 
Further, it was suggested that if the young men selected 
were to come from the villages to which the new tractors were 
to be assigned, that 
1. the farmers would have better rapport with the 
drivers; 
2. the drivers would take better care of the equipment 
since a new tractor was still a prestigious item in most 
villages and, psychologically at least, the tractors belonged 
to the drivers; 
3. pre-selection of the villages to be assigned tractors 
would be required; and thus 
4. the villages would know the tractors were coming and 
begin to prepare for them. 
The Director of the CCFU approved the idea, and shortly, 
the first of three training sessions were begun. The trainees 
selected were required to be sons of cooperative members and 
literate. Attendance ranged from 14 to 20 trainees, they were 
taught how to drive, how to properly cultivate a parcel of 
land, proper care of a tractor including daily, weekly, and 
monthly maintenance procedures, and how to make minor repairs. 
When the new tractors arrived, 50 well-trained, anxious 
drivers greeted them with enthusiasm. But so did conflict. 
As the new tractors were being assembled at the CCFU head-
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quarters in Khanewal, the drivers assigned to the old tractors 
began to cause an unexpected problem. The old drivers claimed 
that they had seniority over the new drivers, and therefore, 
should be the drivers of the new tractors. The technicians in 
the field objected and claimed it was the old, poorly-trained 
drivers who were responsible for the poor condition of the 
first group of tractors. The matter was submitted to the CCFU 
Director for arbitration, and he ruled that, because of their 
seniority, the old drivers had the right to request reassign­
ment to the new tractors. 
The result of the Director's decision was as follows. 
The old drivers, still poorly trained and refusing to keep 
their equipment properly maintained (claiming that it was too 
much work and that they were hired to drive, not repair,) soon 
had the new tractors in a state of disrepair; the villagers, 
already unhappy because an "intruder" had taken away a job 
assigned to one of their own, became hostile to both the 
driver and his tractor; the new drivers, bitterly disappointed 
and feeling betrayed at having been assigned to "foreign" 
villages and poor equipment, soon fell into work patterns re­
sembling those of the old drivers. 
The Khanewal project continued to function with government 
support until 1973. During fiscal year 1972-73, the Annual 
Development Programmes (ADP) allocation for the Khanewal proj­
ect was Rs. 560,000. The following year, however, the proj­
ect was removed from the ADP allocations for cooperative 
development schemes (Planning and Development Board, Punjab). 
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East Pakistan Rural Development 
Introduction 
The country of Pakistan began to systematically plan its 
economic development during the mid-1950's through the imple­
mentation of five-year plans. However, the major focus of 
the planning was directed toward West Pakistan, the seat of 
the national government. To a large extent, East Pakistan's 
role in the planning process was minor, as was its share of 
the planned outcomes. For example, in the First Five-Year 
Plan (1956-1960) the portion of public sector development 
expenditures allocated to East Pakistan was approximately 20% 
of the national total. It was not until the Third Five-Year 
Plan (1966-1970) that this figure approached 50% (Elkinton, 
1976). 
Also, East Pakistan's rural areas contained nearly 95% of 
the Province's population, produced 95% of the value of ex­
ports, and was responsible for some 70% of the annual gross 
domestic product (GDP). Despite this importance, for the 
first three five-year plans. East Pakistan's agricultural 
sector was awarded an average of only 17% of the Province's 
total allocation (see Table 6). Elkinton blamed this rather 
lackadaisical attitude toward agricultural development, at 
least partially, on a U.S. foreign aid program. 
Until FY1967/68 the government of Pakistan assumed 
a relatively relaxed posture vis-à-vis agriculture ; 
a sort of benign neglect prevailed. One important 
reason for this was the easy availability of food 
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grain and vegetable oil imports from the United 
States Public Law 480 (P1480) program. These 
import purchases were made with rupees and most of 
the funds generated were in turn made available to 
finance economic development projects. Thus, it 
is not surprising that development planning offi­
cials . . . were relatively unconcerned about the 
lack of agricultural production progress, (p. 61) 
Table 6. Development allocations to the agricultural sector 
in the first three plans (million of Rupees)^  
Five-Year Plan of^ ïotal 
First Plan (1956-1960) 1,231.1 228.6 19.0 
Second Plan (1961-1965) 5,550.5 996.6 17.0 
Third Plan (1966-1970) 14,390.0 2,124.0 14.8 
E^lkinton (1976, p. 61) 
Comilla Rural Development 
In sharp contrast with this rather negative attitude to­
ward rural development was the establishment of the Pakistan 
Academy for Rural Development in Comilla in 1959, and the 
resultant research initiated by that institution. East 
Pakistan was divided into 17 administrative districts, one of 
which was Comilla District. Each district was divided into 
subdivisions, and each subdivision further divided into 
thanas, Thanas are comparable to counties in the United 
States. Comilla Kotwali thana, in 1961, had a rural popula­
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tion of nearly 160,000 in an area of 107 square miles. 
Comilla was located at the eastern edge of the Brahama-
putra River delta, approximately 80 miles north of the Bay of 
Bengal. The area was extremely hot and moist during the 
summer, 90% of the 60 to 175 inches of annual rainfall 
occurred between May and November, and flooding was an annual 
occurrence. Ironically, irrigation was required during the 
winter growing season. Rice was the dominant crop, with 
nearly 90% of the land under cultivation devoted to it. 
The average farmer of Comilla owned or rented 1.5 acres 
of land, broken into parcels of 1/2 acre or less. Farmers who 
owned their land were often in debt, and were required to pay, 
on the average, about 40% of their harvest to the money­
lender. Tenant farmer contracts called for a payment of 50% 
of their harvest to the landlord. 
Under the prevailing system of credit, loans were 
secured by the sale of parcels of land to the 
moneylenders; the borrowing farmer then paid rent 
to the new owner for the use of the land. Annual 
carrying charges . . . ranged between 60% and 90% 
of the loan. (Raper, 1970, p. 8) 
In 1959, only one Comilla farmer in 25 used commercial 
fertilizer. Only half of the farmers used animal manure be­
cause this commodity also served as fuel for cooking fires. 
Their tools and equipment were primitive—a short-handled hoe, 
a heavy-bladed knife, a hand scythe, a wooden-wheeled cart, 
and a metal-pointed wooden plow. Many farmers also had bull­
ocks, but these animals were often small, weak, and ill-fed. 
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Despite the high population density, communication links 
were poor between individual villages and between Comilla's 
villages and the outside world. 
This isolation is represented by the narrow single 
path wandering from the village between the paddy 
fields to a distant paved road leading to the town. 
Life in the village has a continuity of its own 
untouched by books, newspapers, radios, electricity 
or machines. The path remains, in a sense, a one­
way path, for the more venturesome and restless 
elements may leave it, while within the village 
even time itself seems to be caught in a backwash 
of existence. (McCarthy, 1963, pp. 6-7) 
Annual flooding often made even the footpaths between 
villages impassable for weeks at a time; distribution of the 
area's weekly newspaper was meager, literacy being approxi­
mately 20%; telephone and telegraph connections were limited 
to the larger cities and towns of the Province ; and although 
transistor radios could be found in some homes, ownership was 
still not common. 
Pakistan Academy for Rural Development 
The original idea for the Pakistan Academy for Rural 
Development at Comilla was first presented at a meeting of 
high ranking Pakistani government officials in 1955. By 
1957, "two boards were established for the 'Pakistan Academies 
for Village Development East/West Pakistan' and their composi­
tion, powers, and related matters set forth" (Raper, p. 26). 
In a speech at Michigan State University, Akhter Hameed Khan, 
Comilla Academy's first director, described the institution's 
major purpose; 
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[The Academy] was started in 1959 as a result of 
recommendations made by a team sent by Michigan 
State University. The institution was set up in 
order to apply the principles of social science to 
public administration and to do research on social 
and economic problems of the villages. It was to be 
a training and research institution. Now this in 
itself is quite a novel idea for a country like 
Pakistan. In the first place, it is quite strange, 
there, to think of applying social science to ad­
ministration. Secondly, to do research about 
rural problems and to try to discover more effec­
tive methods of rural development are also novel 
ideas. 
As our "laboratory" area, we received the thana 
around Comilla Academy, a thana being an administra­
tive unit roughly equal to a county. We have con­
centrated our research in this area, analyzing the 
rural position economically, socially, and psycho­
logically. But apart from this kind of academic 
research, we also undertook a series of action 
programs, action research, to change and to re­
organize and to find out more effective methods of 
doing things. (Khan, 1964, pp. 9-10) 
The academy's action research became noted for its 
creative experimentation and unique pilot fieldwork. The 
primary focus of the Academy-sponsored rural development pro­
jects was to involve the farmers and their families. 
The central concept of the Academy from its begin­
ning . . , has been to regard Comilla as a labora­
tory for social and economic research, and to en­
list the people of the thana, the staff of the 
Academy, and the local officers of government in a 
joint program of research and experimentation. 
And the staff members of the Academy—Pakistani and 
foreign alike—had to start by listening to the 
villagers, because that was the only way to find 
out where the process of change had to begin and— 
furthermore—the only way to persuade the villagers 
that the people from the Academy might be worth 
listening to. (Bell, 1970, p. viii) 
Two assumptions were made by the Comilla Academy staff 
regarding the requirements for successful rural development. 
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The first assumption was that progress depended upon the will­
ingness of the villagers to be innovative. Therefore, one of 
the first concerns was to ascertain the attitudes and prior­
ities of the village leaders. The second assumption was that 
once the villagers adopted a small innovation and realized its 
success, that they would be more likely to accept larger, more 
complicated innovations leading to major change (Raper, 1970). 
Consequently, the rural development projects that ema­
nated from the Academy were designed to make the farmers aware 
of innovative economic, political, and social activities that 
were adaptable to or specifically created for their local 
culture. At the same time, 
these development programs . . . were limited largely 
to improve organizational activities focused on 
supplying more profitable new technology to farmers, 
including the provision of training to insure the 
. . . productive use of the new technology. 
(Stevens, 1976, p. 98) 
From 1959 through 1971, numerous experiments and pilot 
projects were undertaken by the Comilla Academy. Of these, 
six were considered of major importance—the agricultural 
cooperatives, the Thana Training and Development Center, the 
rural public works program, the thana irrigation program, the 
women's program and family planning, and the rural education 
experiments. Because of its similarities to the Khanewal Proj­
ect in West Pakistan, the agricultural cooperative project 
was examined in depth. 
92 
The Comilla Agricultural Cooperatives 
Having been charged with the difficult task of aiding the 
rural population of the Comilla thana, the Director of the 
Pakistan Academy for Rural Development and his staff ap­
proached the problem from what was then a unique position. 
Instead of briefly surveying the area of concern and then 
meeting with "outside" consultants to formulate their strategy, 
the usual procedure, Khan and his staff instead met with in­
dividual farmers, village groups, and local leaders. These 
informal, yet systematic consultations, in conjunction with 
surveying actual village conditions, led to the formulation of 
six basic hypotheses: 
1. A viable private economic organization was 
needed which could serve as a basis for colla­
borative effort, and through which mechaniza­
tion and other approved methods could be in­
troduced. 
2. The village would be recognized as the basic 
unit, with those families whose heads decided 
to do so becoming members of a local voluntary 
group. 
3. Some linkage would be needed between these vol­
untary groups in the villages and the academy. 
Since it would be impossible to work directly 
with individual members of these groups, some 
form of representation would be needed. 
4. A training method would follow logically from 
the above in which the organizers and model 
farmers would come to the Academy for weekly 
training sessions, followed by village meetings 
where the ideas learned would constitute the 
"lessons" for the villagers. 
5. The early technical "inputs" would be furnished 
largely by a team of Japanese rice-cultivator 
demonstrators furnished by the Columbo Plan, 
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who would use the Academy's own farm and some 
land in nearby villages for demonstration 
plots, and who would teach at the weekly meet­
ings and work with the model farmers. 
6. Inasmuch as only the simplest techniques such 
as line sowing and improved fertilization could 
be adopted at first by individual villagers 
(considering the size of land holdings and other 
available resources) early emphasis would be 
given to these techniques and extended soon 
thereafter to joint planning, joint purchasing, 
credit, and joint use of machinery. (Raper, 
1970, pp. 46-47) 
All of these hypotheses led Khan and his staff to con­
clude that strategies based upon cooperative principles would 
serve as the best vehicle for initiating solutions to the 
area's major problem. The purposes for the formulation of the 
cooperatives were obvious, "to devise ways of increasing the 
agricultural production of ordinary cultivators, both to im­
prove their incomes and to enlarge the food supply of the 
nation" (Schuman, 1967, p. 3). However, results from past 
cooperative efforts indicated that "normal" cooperative 
strategies would not suffice. Therefore, it was concluded 
by the Academy personnel that: 
1. Basic changes from conventional cooperative efforts 
were required. 
2. Changes in the rural social structure had to be made. 
3. The individual's role within the social structure had 
to be altered. 
With these parameters in mind, it was decided that two inter­
related cooperatives be established, a village cooperative 
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system and a supportive Central Cooperative Association. 
Village Cooperatives 
The village cooperative system, as initiated by the 
Comilla Academy for Rural Development had at its core two key 
persons. The first was called the organizer. Organizers were 
selected by groups of farmers themselves, and the organizer's 
function was to serve as liaison between the village coopera­
tive society and the Academy. The importance of the organizer 
was emphasized by Khan when he told the villagers, "He must be 
a man whom you trust. We don't care whether he can read or 
write; if he cannot read . . . we'll run a literacy course for 
him. But you send somebody whom you trust" (Khan, 1964, p. 34). 
The organizer's major duties included taking the weekly cash 
savings to the Academy for deposit, relaying problems to the 
Academy staff that had arisen since the last visit, and dis­
seminating to the villagers ideas learned by attending 
Academy meetings. 
The second key person in the village cooperative was the 
model farmer. The model farmer served essentially as the 
local agricultural extension agent. His importance was 
recognized because: 
(1) He is a resident village farmer who serves his 
own society rather than an outsider who serves 
several villages. (2) He is selected by the other 
members of a local voluntary cooperative group 
rather than by the Academy or some other agency. 
(3) He comes to the Academy one day each week for 
training, and so provides liaison between the 
farmers and the Academy. (4) He is one of a group 
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of village farmers who as a unit serve as innovator 
(individual innovators are rare). (5) He is taught 
by the Academy staff and advisors. (Raper, 1970, p. 51) 
The significance of that dimension of the Comilla Project 
was emphasized by Schuman when he wrote: 
Perhaps the most striking departure from ordinary 
efforts at rural development has been this emphasis 
on developing new local leadership. Rather than 
concentrating on sending extension officers and 
other government aid officials "into" villages, the 
Comilla program has encouraged village cooperatives 
to choose their own leaders for specially created 
roles such as Cooperative "organizer," "Accountant," 
and "Model Farmer." These men, whose past, present, 
and future lives are rooted in the village, are re­
quired to come at frequent and regular intervals 
... to the Central Association headquarters to dis­
cuss village problems, observe new methods and 
materials of farming, attend classes on subjects and 
skills directly related to their roles, and transact 
business with the Central Cooperative Association 
credit office, (pp. 4-5) 
Later, in many villages, the organizer and model farmer 
positions were combined into a single position called a mana­
ger. The manager, having assumed the roles and duties of both 
the organizer and model farmer, became an almost full-time 
employee of the local society. As such, he received incentive 
payments for each member regularly attending the weekly 
village meeting and making a savings deposit; for each acre of 
land to which improved cultivation practices were applied; for 
organizing the schedule for using the cooperatively shared 
local irrigation pump; as well as receiving 1% of the loan 
payments paid back to the society by its members. 
By mid-1960, seven village-based cooperatives had been 
formed. In addition, a vegetable growers society, a women's 
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cooperative, and a weavers cooperative were also functioning. 
By 1970, over 300 agricultural cooperatives were operating in 
the Comilla thana (see Table 7). That the goals of the pro­
gram were being met, i.e., aiding those rural persons who 
needed help the most, was seen by the fact that virtually all 
of the cooperative members were farmers whose landholding were 
five acres or less (Raper, 1970). 
Table 7. Status of Comilla-type agricultural cooperatives, 
1970a 
Average Average Average Average Overdue 
Number Number Shares & Loans Loans Over 
of Coop of Coop Savings Issued Total Loans 
Societies Members per per (%) 
per Thana per Thana Member Member 
Comilla Thana 301 11,673 $28.98 $52.71 2.0 more 
1960/61- than 1 year 
1968/69 
Three Exter­ 229 5,873 $10.34 $57.75 4.4 (2.5 
nal Thanas more than 
1963-64- 1 year) 
1968/69 
Seven Comilla 196 5.620 $19.53 $54.60 9.5 
District Thanas 
1965-Nov. 1970 
a^dapted from Stevens (1976, p. 101) 
Central Cooperative Association 
In January, 1962 the Kotwali Thana Central Cooperative 
Association (KTCCA) was formed. The Association's function 
was to support the activities of the local cooperatives by 
Cooperative 
System 
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providing services that individual cooperatives could not pro­
vide and to serve as a cohesive coordinating unit. In addi­
tion, the KTCCA was to provide general rules and regulations, 
discipline, training, and credit. Specifically, the Central 
Cooperative Association was created to 
promote the continuation and expansion of savings; 
make provisions for crop-production loans and . . . 
credit to the local cooperative societies (not to 
individual members) ... ; provide training for 
the members and staff of the cooperatives, carry on 
bulk marketing and purchasing activities; procure, 
maintain, and hire out useful farm machines to the 
primary societies; establish a research and demon­
stration . . . activity to yield practical . . . 
information on cooperatives, farm machinery and 
. . . civil administration . . ., and develop by­
laws and hire staff to achieve the above goals. 
(Raper, 1970, pp. 58, 59) 
In order to become a member of the Central Credit Asso­
ciation, a local village cooperative society had to meet a 
number of requirements. Among these requirements were that 
the local society must show indications of village-wide sup­
port; that the society meet regularly and was able to solve 
its local problems cooperatively within the group ; that the 
society was capable of raising collective funds, with contri­
butions received from all members, regardless how poor; and 
that they could select several members to serve as their re­
presentative at Central Cooperative Association meetings, 
training and demonstration sessions (Schuman, 1967). 
Among the first projects supported by the KTCCA was the 
training of drivers for the tractors assigned to the Academy 
by the Department of Agriculture. They were for the farmers* 
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use on a rental basis. The first two tractors to arrive at 
the Academy in March of 1960, produced little initial interest 
among the local farmers. They "saw that the tractors did the 
work well, but assumed apparently that the equipment was suited 
only to the farms of the government and the large landowners" 
(Raper, 1970, p. 77). Within a short time, however, having 
witnessed cultivation demonstrations on the fields of the more 
innovative and daring farmers, and hearing their positive 
reactions, "many farmers were wanting the use of the tractors 
and stood in a long queue at the Academy with the rent money 
in their hands" (Raper, 1970, p. 78). 
But the project was not without its faults. To keep the 
two tractors from spending most of their time driving from one 
village to another, the Academy required that at least five 
farmers from the same village, having a minimum of eight con-
contiguous acres for cultivation, jointly request the tractors 
before they would allow the tractors to go to a village. 
There was still much factionalism in the villages at this time 
and the farmers, because of past experiences, were afraid that 
their rent money would become "lost" or stolen. Both tractors 
remained inactive for a few days before one enterprising 
village came forth to request a tractor. Seeing that the 
money had not disappeared and that the tractor did proceed to 
the village and complete the contracted work, other village 
groups began to request the tractor at an increasing rate 
(Raper, 1970). 
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A second problem developed when it was found that the 
plots of land owned by each individual farmer were too small 
to be economically plowed with a tractor; too much turning, 
braking, and hydraulic lift use were required. The Academy 
personnel asked the farmers to solve this problem themselves. 
After much discussion, the farmers decided to drive small 
stakes into the ground to serve as temporary boundary markers 
(boundaries were traditionally formed by constructing a line 
of raised earth), allow the tractors to plow the contiguous 
holdings as a single plot of land, and then reconstructing 
the earthen boundaries. This system worked to everyone's 
satisfaction. 
The third problem that arose with the coming of the 
tractors was that the drivers who accompanied those vehicles 
were not happy with their job assignment. The drivers dis­
liked village life and refused to work during the heat of mid­
day, when it rained, or on weekends. The farmers, who were 
used to working extremely long hours in their fields thought 
that the drivers' restrictions were abominable. The farmers 
called the drivers lazy and accused them of sabotaging the 
tractors when they didn't feel like working. It soon became 
apparent that the drivers, chosen because they were literate 
and thus able to keep records and make periodic reports to 
the Agricultural Department, were offsetting their usefulness 
with the negative rapport they had with the farmers. 
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Finally, it was suggested by the Academy staff that a 
training school be set up to train representatives from the 
villages to operate the tractors. This suggestion was re­
ceived positively by all concerned. The Department of Agri­
culture drivers could return to working government-owned land 
close to urban areas, the farmers would have direct control 
over the driver since he would be under their direct hire, 
and the newly trained drivers would hold prestigious positions 
in the village. 
The first six-week tractor driver training session began 
with 40 young men from the villages participating. All 
trainees were required to have met the following restrictions ; 
1. They were able-bodied. 
2. They or their father was a member of a cooperative 
society. 
3. They were familiar with agricultural work. 
4. They were literate (for reading maintenance and re­
pair manuals). 
5. They had an interest in machinery. 
6. They had been chosen by their fellow society members. 
Thirty-six of the 40 young men who began the first training 
session completed the entire course. A second group began 
training just a week after the first group returned to their 
villages. 
The tractor driver training course was conducted in con-
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 ^ junction with the newly organized cooperative machine shop 
and tractor station. This unit was established to coordinate 
the tractor rental scheme, maintain all of the cooperatives' 
machinery, make major repairs on the equipment, and to train 
mechanics, tractor drivers, well drillers, and irrigation 
pump operators. From the modest beginning described above, 
the shop and training center developed rapidly. By the crop­
ping year 1967-68, this concern was maintaining and repairing 
some 28 tractors that were cultivating nearly 5,000 acres of 
land and performing another 9,000 hours of additional agri-
culturally-oriented operations. 
The Comilla Project continued to function with government 
support until 1971 when the Province of East Pakistan broke 
away from Pakistan and formed the independent nation of 
Bangladesh. 
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CHAPTER IV. ANALYSIS 
Introduction 
The problem of this study was to analyze a farm mechani­
zation project conducted in the Punjab region of West Pakistan 
and an integrated rural development project conducted in the 
Comilla thana of East Pakistan. This analysis was made by 
extracting data from the case studies previously developed 
for each of the selected rural development projects. 
For analysis of the Comilla rural development project, a 
case study was developed by synthesizing written materials 
from a variety of sources. Sources reviewed included the 
periodicals and journals Pakistan Quarterly, South Asian Re­
view, and American University Fieldstaff Reports; speeches, 
articles and essays written by Akhter Hameed Khan, the first 
Director of the Pakistan Academy for Rural Development and 
the primary developer of the Comilla project; essays by C. M. 
Elkinton, a member of the USAID mission in Dacca from 1961 to 
1971, and R. D. Stevens, a Michigan State University advisor 
to the Academy for Rural Development in Comilla; and a com­
prehensive text on the Comilla project by A. F. Raper. 
For analysis of the Khanewal rural development project, 
a case study was also developed by synthesizing selected 
written materials. In addition to the journals and periodi­
cals listed above, the following sources were also reviewed: 
Economic Development and Cultural Change, Economic and Poli-
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tical Weekly, and Pakistan Development Review; Pakistan 
Government publications developed by Punjab Planning and De­
velopment Board and the Ministry of Food and Agriculture; 
publications by G. F. Papanek and C. H. Gotsch, Harvard Uni­
versity advisors to the Pakistan Government; and a case study 
of farm mechanization in the Punjab. However, specific ref­
erence to tne Khanewal project was rarely found. Therefore, 
many of the details related to the farm mechanization project 
in Khanewal were synthesized from reports, papers, and lec­
ture notes developed by the author from his personal experi­
ence in the Khanewal project. 
The data extracted from each case study was compared 
using Bordenave's revised set of 39 interdisciplinary ques­
tions. When data related to a particular question could not 
be found in the case study, a thorough search of relevant 
literature was conducted in an attempt to adequately answer 
each question. 
The interdisciplinary analysis resulted in a composite 
comparison of the two selected rural development projects. 
The findings of the study were developed by using the com­
posite comparison to test the propositions of the study con­
tained in Chapter I. Conclusions and recommendations were 
then drawn from the findings. 
Case Study Comparison 
An interdisciplinary technique was formulated to analyze 
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the specific data within the case studies. This technique 
consisted of applying a series of 39 questions regarding the 
design, organization, and functions of the selected rural 
development projects. The questions were adapted from D. 
Bordenave's "Communication of Agricultural Innovations in 
Latin America: The Need for New Models," in Communication 
Research, Volume 3, 1976, and P. Hill's "Diffusion of Innova­
tion qua Transfer of Technology: Critique, Comments, and 
Recommendations," an unpublished casual paper. Journalism 
Department, Iowa State University, 1976. The 39 questions 
were clustered into seven categories--cultural, economic, 
educational, political, psychological, sociological, and 
technical questions. 
Category I: Cultural 
Question: What was the historical genesis of [the social 
organization]? 
Answer: A. Khanewal 
The majority of the participants in the Khanewal 
Project were refugees who emigrated from India at 
the time of partition in 1947. They were arbi­
trarily formed into villages in a cooperative 
settlement scheme that provided refugees with land, 
housing, and the basics to begin farming operations. 
Two distinct leadership patterns developed. 
One was a natural leadership pattern, whereby the 
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natural leaders, the outspoken and innovative per­
sons of each village, assumed the leadership role 
and usually were elected president of the local 
village cooperative. The second leadership pattern 
was a structured one, developed by the CCFU when it 
sent civil servants to each village to serve as 
village managers. These village managers were 
directly responsible to a Circle Officer (10-20 
villages comprised a circle), who, in turn, was 
directly responsible to the CCFU Director in 
Khanewal. 
B. Comilla 
The participants in the Comilla Project had a 
tight knit village social structure. 
The villages are divided into two or more 
paras (sections), either on a geographical 
basis or on the basis of kinship locations. 
Sometimes there may be another basis for 
social relationship whereby certain baris 
(families with equal status and similar 
background, though not necessarily related 
by blood) are contiguously located. In 
every village there are a few prominent 
families that have for decades guided vil­
lage politics. (Zaidi, 1970, p, 17) 
Village leadership usually consisted of an in­
formal council of elders who "prescribe social 
controls in the village" (Zaidi, p. 18). Member­
ship in this council was retained in a family by 
having the oldest son inherit the council position 
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from his father. However, village councils were 
beginning to lose their effectiveness because of 
"various modernizing influences . . . and the 
presence of numerous factions in the villages" 
(Zaidi, p. 18). 
Question: Were the farmers consulted and were their needs for 
innovation ascertained? 
Answer: A. Khanewal 
The farmers participating in the Khanewal proj­
ect were not consulted during the planning or the 
implementation of the development project. For ex­
ample, in the farm mechanization project, the proj­
ect development was conducted by government plan­
ners. Implementation of the project was undertaken 
by CCFU without any input from the farmers. The 
farmers sometimes did not even know that the trac­
tors were coming until they arrived in the village. 
During the initial stages of the project, the 
amount of land, types and style of structures, and 
other necessities given to the refugees, were all 
predetermined by government officials. For ex­
ample, when the government decided to introduce 
the new high-yielding varieties of wheat, they 
simply ceased to make available varieties other 
than the high-yielding varieties. As far as can 
I 
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be determined, no one ever approached the farmers 
to ascertain their needs and plans for change or 
innovation. 
B. Comilla 
Two assumptions were made by the Comilla Academy 
staff regarding the requirements for successful 
rural development. The first assumption was that 
progress depended upon the willingness of the vil­
lagers to be innovative. Therefore, one of the 
first actions taken by the staff was to ascertain 
the attitudes and priorities of the village lead­
ers . 
The second assumption was that once the vil­
lagers adopted a small innovation and realized its 
success, that they would be more likely to accept 
larger, more complicated innovations leading to 
major change. Consequently, the Comilla rural de­
velopment projects were designed to make the 
farmers aware of the innovative economic, politi­
cal, and social activities that were adaptable to 
or specifically created for their local culture. 
Question: Did the innovations take into account regional and 
local differences in ecology, economy, farming 
habits, and cultural norms? 
Answer : A. Khanewal 
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The high-yielding varieties of wheat had been 
acclimatized for the region. However, recognition 
was not given to the facts that: (1) the farmers 
required the buffalo for other things besides 
plowing land, and therefore, would not give them 
up; (2) the high-yielding wheat did not correspond 
with the local variety's hardness, color, or taste; 
(3) the new varieties were short stemmed and re­
sulted in decreasing an important fodder crop; 
(4) the farmers felt the plowing date was critical 
to a good harvest, and therefore, everyone wanted 
the tractor at the same time; (5) the tractor size 
and their accompanying implements were unsuitable 
for use in 1/4 acre plots of land, the traditional 
division size used to accommodate flood irrigation; 
(6) the farmers could not afford the greater inputs 
of fertilizer and irrigation water required by the 
new wheat varieties. 
B, Comilla 
The rural development projects that were devel­
oped by the Academy were designed, made adaptable 
to, or were specifically created for local cul­
tures. As such, the village was recognized as the 
basic unit of development, and local ecology, 
economics, and agricultural methods were taken into 
account. 
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Question: What were the feedback possibilities and channels 
for the farmers to communicate their needs and 
results to the innovation sources and policy­
makers? 
Answer; A. Khanewal 
Theoretically, a feedback structure existed in 
the CCFU organization. An individual farmer could 
and sometimes did communicate his needs or com­
plaints to the village cooperative president. 
The village president, if he could not solve the 
problem, was to pass the request or complaint on 
to the village manager, who passed it on to the 
Circle Officer, who passed it on to the Cooperative 
Director in Khanewal. In reality, a request or 
complaint rarely got beyond the village manager 
because a fear of the immediate superior existed at 
each bureaucratic level of the cooperative heir-
archy. A criticism, complaint, or even a request 
for assistance was regarded by the individual civil 
servant as a sign of his being unable to handle the 
situation. As a result, feedback to the program 
organizers was virtually non-existent. 
Further, there existed in the culture of rural 
West Pakistan, the phenomenon of holding in awe, 
persons of higher political, governmental, or 
economic rank. Consequently, on the rare occasion 
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that the Circle Officer or the Director visited a 
local village or individual farm family, the local 
villager, unless extremely agitated, would remain 
silent or even praise a situation he really foiind 
abhorrent, 
B. Comilla 
The village cooperative system, as initiated by 
the Comilla Academy for Rural Development had at 
its core two key persons. The first was called the 
organizer. Organizers were selected by groups of 
farmers themselves, and their function was to serve 
as liaison between the village cooperative society 
and the Academy. 
The second key person in the village cooperative 
was the model farmer. The model farmer served es­
sentially as the local agricultural extension agent, 
and one of his responsibilities was to serve as the 
innovator and to provide a direct link between the 
village farmers and the Academy. The organizer and 
model farmer positions were later combined to a 
single position of manager. 
Question: What were the relationships between the processes 
of [human development], formal education, organi­
zation, politization, and technification of the 
rural population? 
Answer: A. Khanewal 
Within the Khanewal project, the processes of 
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human development, organization, and technifica-
tion were the responsibility of the CCFU, Formal 
education was the responsibility of the Ministry 
of Education, although the formal technical educa­
tion of the tractor drivers and mechanics was con­
ducted by the CCFU. Politization was undertaken 
by the various competing political parties. 
B. Comilla 
From 1959 through 1971, numerous experiments 
and pilot projects were undertaken by the Comilla 
Academy. Of these, six were considered of major 
importance—the Agricultural Cooperative, the Thana 
Training and Development Center, the rural public 
works program, the thana irrigation program, the 
women's program and family planning, and rural edu­
cation experiments. Thus, all processes except 
politization were integrated through the Academy 
staff. 
Category II; Economic 
Question: Did the majority of the farmers own their land, 
either individually or cooperatively? 
Answer ; A. Khanewal 
The ownership of the land was a complicated 
matter in the Khanewal project. One of the stipu­
lations made by the Pakistan Government, through 
112 
the CCFU, when the 12 1/2 acres of land was given 
to the refugees was that the land could not be 
divided. For a man with more than one son, how­
ever, this stipulation was in direct conflict with 
a Moslem law which stated that a man's land should 
be divided equally between his sons. Therefore, 
the title of the land remained with the government, 
but the farmers were given the right to the land in 
perpetuity. 
B. Comilla 
An East Pakistan village is a small unit con­
taining roughly between 50 and 125 families 
who own the land adjoining their village, 
about 200 or 250 acres. In a village, there 
are three classes of people, of farmers. 
First, there are the landless laborers, 
about 20% of the population, who might own 
their household but little, if any, land. 
At the other extreme, about 5% or 10% of the 
farmers might own 10 to 15 acres or more, 
which would classify them as rich farmers. 
Then there is the vast majority of farmers, 
70% to 75%, who are small farmers, owning 
one and a half to three acres of land. 
(Khan, 1964, p. 12) 
Question: Who controlled the economic institutions, parti­
cularly the market, credit, and input supply or­
ganizations? 
Answer: A. Khanewal 
For the farmers in the Khanewal project, the 
economic institutions were controlled almost ex­
clusively, both directly and through the CCFU, by 
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the national government. For example, an individ­
ual farmer's cotton crop was collected by the CCFU, 
weighed, recorded, and sent to a centrally located 
godown where it was stored until purchased by 
government cotton mills. The price was established 
by the national government economists. Purchase of 
seed and fertilizer on credit was available through 
the Ministry of Agriculture's facilities. Amounts 
and types were strictly regulated and during times 
of shortage, black market operations were common. 
General loans were also available through the CCFU 
organization at reasonable interest rates, but were 
not easy to secure. 
B. Comilla 
Prior to the Comilla project farmers who owned 
their land were often in debt, and were required to 
pay, on the average, about 40% of their harvest to 
the moneylender. Tenant farmer contracts called 
for a payment of 50% of their harvest to the land­
lord. 
In 1962, as part of the Comilla project, the 
Kotwali Thana Central Cooperative Association 
(KTCCA) was formed. The Association's function was 
to support the activities of the local cooperatives 
by providing such services as the promotion of 
savings, crop-production loans and credit to the 
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local societies, bulk marketing and purchasing 
activities, and so on. 
Question: Did [the adoption of the proffered innovations] 
promote employment or unemployment, fixation of the 
rural population or migration to the cities, en­
richment of the already rich or better income dis­
tribution? 
Answer : A. Khanewal 
The Khanewal project's innovations in general 
were employment producing. The farm mechanization 
project created jobs for drivers and mechanics. 
The cooperative itself developed positions for 
civil servants, construction workers, community 
development workers, teachers, health workers, and 
clerks. Because of the nature of the project, it 
tended to take people out of the cities and return 
them to rural areas. The project also had the 
potential for aiding in the redistribution of 
wealth. One of the goals of the project was to aid 
the subsistence farmer in Rrowin# a surplus of 
wheat that could be sold in the market. 
B. Comilla 
Many of the Comilla project's activities also 
promoted employment in the local area. Persons 
were hired to serve as extension agents, organ­
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izers, managers, tractor drivers and mechanics, 
family planning leaders, and so on. It also helped 
to stabilize the population and did nothing to 
promote migration to the cities. And like the 
Khanewal project, the Comilla project had the 
potential for aiding the redistribution of wealth 
by providing a way for subsistence farmers to grow 
surplus crops for market. 
Category III: Educational 
Question: How adequate were the change agents or extension 
service personnel as a two-way communication 
channel? 
Answer : A. Khanewal 
The role of the change agent in the Khanewal 
project was the responsibility of U.S. Peace Corps 
Volunteers, and civil servants employed for the 
Basic Democracies and agricultural extension pro­
grams . None of the training programs for the per­
sonnel involved in these programs emphasized the 
need for the workers to be the means for a two-way 
communication system. Rather, emphasis was placed 
on the change agent's role of bringing the govern­
ment's programs to the people, a definite one-way 
communication channel. 
B. Comilla 
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The central concept of the Academy from its 
beginning . . . has been to regard Comilla 
as a laboratory for social and economic 
research, and to enlist the people of the 
thana, the staff of the Academy, and the 
local officers of government in a joint 
program of research and experimentation. 
And the staff members of the Academy . . . 
had to start by listening to the villagers 
because that was the only way to find out 
where the process of change had to begin 
and—furthermore—the only way to persuade 
the villagers that the people from the 
Academy might be worth listening to. 
(Bell, 1970, p. viii) 
Clearly, the personnel involved in the Comilla 
project were charged with the obligation to develop 
and keep open, a two-way communication channel. 
Question: Were [the change agents or extension service 
personnel] technically competent, ideologically 
oriented to the welfare of the farmers, method­
ologically adequate? 
Answer : A. Khanewal 
To be qualified for employment in the program, 
the change agents were required to have success­
fully passed through the normal academic training 
program (agriculture, health, social work) plus 
successfully complete the special training of the 
specific agency they would be employed by. Often, 
however, the training, while technically suffi­
cient , failed to emphasize the economic and social 
plight of the rural subsistence farmer. As a re-
117 
suit, the agents saw the persons they were sent to 
help as lazy, ignorant, resistant to change, and 
socially, less acceptable. 
B. Comilla 
The change agents involved in the Comilla proj­
ect were not all required to have had"strong 
academic experience in a technical area. Instead 
emphasis was placed on training those villagers 
selected by their peers to serve as change agents. 
The Academy required the chosen villagers to 
attend weekly classes to upgrade their level of 
expertise. Regarding the goverment-hired change 
agents, 
with the creation of the Thana Training and 
Development Center all of the thana repre­
sentatives of the various government depart­
ments concerned with development were 
brought together in one location for the 
first time. This association with the 
Academy staff led to a changing attitude 
on the part of the government officials; 
they began to be concerned with teaching 
better methods of rural development as well 
as with regulation. (Raper, 1970, p. 14) 
Question; How did farmers diagnose and solve their problems? 
Answer : A. Khanewal 
There was little evidence available to suggest 
how the local farmers diagnosed and solved their 
problems prior to the Khanewal project. In many 
ways their lifestyle was not very different from 
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that of subsistence farmers 2000 years ago. To­
day's subsistence farmer still lived in a mud hut 
with a dirt floor and straw roof, and plowed his 
land using a water buffalo and a wooden stick. 
The Khanewal project rarely provided the sub­
sistence farmer with the opportunity to solve 
his own problems. For example, the vast major 
ity of development projects in the area were al­
ways giving and telling rather than asking and 
acquiring. Secondly, local education used the 
rote system, which provided little experience for 
analyzation or problem-solving. Thirdly, an ex­
pression commonly heard in the area was Inshallah, 
meaning "God willing" or "it is God's will." The 
term was often applied when the subsistence farmer 
was confronted with a problem. 
B. Comilla 
Prior to the Comilla project, the local sub­
sistence farmers were also living much like their 
ancestors of 2000 years ago. The advent of the or­
ganizer and the model farmer schemes, however, 
plus several rural education experiments, provided 
new impetus for the rural subsistence farmers in 
the Comilla project to begin to look at their prob­
lems differently. A few early successes helped to 
show the farmers that they themselves could con-
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tribute to the solutions. One example was the 
decision by the farmers to temporarily replace 
their earthen field dividers with wooden stakes 
while the fields were being plowed with a tractor. 
Question: How did [farmers] search for extracommunity re­
sources and help? 
Answer: A. Khanewal 
In the majority of the cases, the rural Pakistani 
farmers and their families were not aware of the 
outside resources available to them. Information 
regarding these extracommunity resources was not 
related to the villagers, nor were visits made to 
any but a few nearby or wealthy villages by the 
resource personnel who were located in the larger 
cities. 
B. Comilla 
With the creation of the Thana Training and 
Development Center all of the thana repre­
sentatives of the various government depart­
ments concerned with development were brought 
together in one location for the first time. 
(Raper, p. 14) 
As a result of this consolidation, extracommunity 
resources were not required. 
How well developed [was the farmers'] communication 
ability? 
A. Khanewal 
Question; 
Answer: 
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Verbal communication was the only communication 
system open to most farmers in the Khanewal proj­
ect. Less than 20% were literate, and even for 
those who could read, printed materials of any kind 
were not available on a regular basis. Television, 
telephone, and telegraph were not available in the 
villages, and the only source of non-local informa­
tion was the radio or a traveler who brought 
printed or verbal information to the village. 
B. Comilla 
In the villages of the Comilla project, weekly 
newspaper distribution was slight. Electronic 
media was non-existent with the exception of a few 
radios. During the period of flooding, the isola­
tion of individual villages was often total. The 
Academy, however, had instituted a two-way verbal 
communication system between the villagers and 
itself and was responsible for instituting a simi­
lar system between the other government agencies 
and the villagers. 
Question; What were the personal and group roles in farmers' 
problem-solving? 
Answer: A. Khanewal 
In general, the CCFU as a unit assumed the major 
role of problem-solving in the Khanewal project. 
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The individual farmers lacked the training, ex­
perience, and facilities for solving their own 
problems. 
B. Comilla 
In the Comilla project, the focus was on de­
veloping within the village cooperative, the tech­
niques, training, and experience to solve local 
problems. A second focus was also placed on in­
dividual problem-solving in several of the rural 
education projects. 
Question: Were the skills necessary for [the] maintenance 
[of adopted innovations] available? 
Answer: A. Khanewal 
Using the CCFU farm mechanization project as an 
example, at the outset of the project, the neces­
sary skills for maintaining or properly using the 
adopted innovation were not observable because: 
(1) the tractor drivers assigned to each tractor 
were uniformly unskilled in proper cultivation and 
tractor maintenance problems; (2) the implements 
were not suited for the way the land was divided; 
(3) the closest fuel supply was from 20 to 40 
miles away; (4) there were no repair shops, 
trained mechanics, or tools and equipment to do 
major or even much minor repair work. 
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As the project progressed, however, the neces­
sary skills were developed as was seen by the hir­
ing of mechanics by the CCFU to begin repairing the 
tractors; centrally located fuel dumps were set up; 
centrally located workshops were built; drivers 
were recalled for a short, intensive training 
session in periodic maintenance procedures and 
proper cultivation techniques; a monthly mainten-
ence check was instituted; and the implements were 
modified for use in small areas. 
B. Comilla 
Using the Comilla farm mechanization project as 
an example, the necessary skills for maintaining or 
properly using the adopted innovations were not 
observable because: (1) the drivers were forced 
to spend too much time traveling from village to 
village to plow an individual's land; (2) the land 
was divided into plots too small for economic trac­
tor plowing; (3) the drivers disliked rural farm 
living and the long work hours they were expected 
to work. 
As the project progressed, however, the neces­
sary skills were developed as was seen when the 
Academy staff required that tractors not go to a 
particular village until at least five farmers had 
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signed up to have their fields plowed; the farmers 
themselves suggested that the earthen field-
dividers be replaced temporarily with wooden 
stakes during the plowing of contiguous fields; a 
tractor driver training school was set up to train 
local youths in the care, maintenance, and proper 
use of the tractors so they could replace the 
government drivers. 
Category IV; Political 
Question: How autonomous or independent was the country from 
external forces which affected its economy and its 
political decisions? 
Answer: At the time of these development projects, the 
country of Pakistan, both East and West was under 
the conflicting influences of the United States 
and China. Both countries were attempting to win 
Pakistan's favor by implementing favorable economic 
assistance and trade programs. The purpose was to 
receive in return, favorable political decisions 
from Pakistan. 
Question: What criteria were used to guide the choice of in­
novations for diffusion--(a) the common welfare, 
(b) the increase of production for export, (c) the 
maintenance of low prices for urban consumers, 
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(d) the profit of big commercial farmers and 
landowners? 
Answer: A. Khanewal 
It appears that the choice of innovations in the 
Khanewal project were made primarily to aid the 
common welfare and as an attempt to maintain low 
food and clothing prices for urban consumers. 
B. Comilla 
It appears that the reason for the innovation 
choices made by Akhter Hameed Khan and the staff 
of the Pakistan Academy for Rural Development were 
solely for the common welfare. 
Question: [What effects did the adoption of certain innova­
tions have] on regional and national development in 
the short, medium, and long range? 
Answer: A, Khanewal 
This scheme was introduced in 1961-62 with 
the following objectives: 
(a) to provide tractor power for farm 
operations and thereby reduce bul­
lock power by 50%; 
(b) to replace 50% bullock power by 
milch cattle for the benefit of 
members. 
Experience showed that individually, the 
farming societies could not take up mech­
anization effectively. Farming societies 
(129) therefore federated into the Colony 
Cooperative Farming Union Limited, Khanewal 
in 1962. Besides arranging essential in­
puts and services like supply of agricul­
tural machinery, tubewells, seeds, fertili­
zer, the Union is providing repair facili­
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ties for tractors and other agricultural 
machinery purchased by the societies, the 
Union has set up a full-fledged tractor 
repair workshop at Vehari and two field 
workshops. (Planning and Development Board, 
Government of the Punjab, 1974, p. 164) 
Allocations for fiscal year 1972-73 for this 
project was .560 million rupees. But for fiscal 
years 1973-74 and 1974-75, no allocations were in­
dicated. On the other hand, .307 million rupees 
were allocated for fiscal year 1974-75 to implement 
a farm mechanization project in the Sialkot Dis­
trict under the auspices of the Zarai Cooperative 
Union, "specifically . . . organized to undertake 
ploughing in Bajwat and Shakargarh areas of Sialkot 
District" (Planning and Development Board, Govern­
ment of the Punjab, 1974, p. 165). 
B. Comilla 
"In the long run, the importance of the Comilla 
program depends on whether, with adaptations to 
local conditions, the principles and procedures 
worked out there can be applied elsewhere in East 
Pakistan and perhaps in other areas" (Raper, 1970, 
p. 232). In 1962, three other thanas began Cômilla-
like development programs. By 1968, they collec­
tively had 641 agricultural societies; 32 non-
agricultural societies; 16,927 members ; and 3,575 
acres under cultivation (Raper, 1970, p. 236). 
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In 1965, seven additional thanas began operating 
Comilla-like development programs. By 1970, these 
seven thanas averaged 196 agricultural societies 
and 5,620 cooperative members in each thana 
(Stevens, 1976, p. 101). 
Question; Was there communication monopoly, censorship, 
blockage, or distortion? 
Answer : A. Khanewal 
Communication in the villages of the Khanewal 
project was extremely limited. The nearest place 
to obtain a newspaper or magazine, the city of 
Mult an, was a minimum of 20 miles away. Visitors, 
with the exception of CCFU personnel were extremely 
rare. Therefore, the villagers had to rely on in­
formation supplied to them by fellow-villagers who 
made the bus trip to Multan and back, an all day 
affair, government controlled radio programs, and 
CCFU visitors. This situation resulted in a 
communication monopoly by the Pakistan Government 
and, although not necessarily deliberate, censor­
ship, blockage, and distortion. 
B. Comilla 
Despite the high population density, communica­
tion links were poor between individual villages 
and between the villages and the outside world. 
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Annual flooding often made footpaths between vil­
lages impassable, newspaper distribution was meager, 
telephone and telegraph available only in the 
larger cities and towns, and ownership of radios 
was still not common. The only regular visitors 
to these villages were the personnel from the 
Pakistan Academy for Rural Development. This sit­
uation created a natural environment for communica­
tion monopoly, censorship, blockage, and distortion. 
Question: Were farmers organized in pressure groups that 
could exert influence on the social structure of 
land tenure, on the production infrastructure, and 
on the marketing system so as to facilitate the 
diffusion of appropriate innovations? 
Answer: A. Khanewal 
The formation of the cooperative unions appeared 
to give villagers the power to make social and 
economic changes. However, CCFU officials simply 
overruled or ignored actions taken by the union 
members that were not to their liking. For ex­
ample, when the villagers petitioned to have the 
tractors removed from their villages, the petition 
was ignored and the government shortly after pur­
chased even more tractors for the area. 
B. Comilla 
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Perhaps the most striking departure from 
ordinary efforts at rural development has 
been this emphasis on developing new local 
leadership. Rather than concentrating on 
sending extension officers and other 
government aid officials "into" villages, 
the Comilla program has encouraged vil­
lage Cooperatives to choose their own 
leaders for specially created roles such as 
Cooperative "Organizer," "Accountant," and 
"Model Farmer." (Schuman, 1967, pp. 4-5) 
Category V; Psychological 
Question: Was there any degree of coercion necessary for the 
adoption of an innovation, either by the market 
situation, the credit institutions, the government, 
the landlords? 
Answer : A, Khanewal 
The major coercive element in the Khanewal 
project was the Pakistan Government, both directly 
and indirectly through the CCFU. It was the gov­
ernment that decided the tractors would be distrib­
uted through the cooperative system; it was the 
government that made only the short stemmed, high-
yielding varieties of wheat available; and it was 
the government that originally required the 
refugees to become members of the cooperative 
societies. 
B. Comilla 
Indications of coercion could not be found while 
studying the Comilla project. 
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Question: What was the role of mass media advertising? 
Answer; Since mass media was not available to the partici­
pants of either project, mass media advertising 
played no role in the selected development 
projects. 
Question: Was [mass medial persuading farmers to adopt in­
novations that they really needed or that they did 
not need? 
Answer: Mass media was not available to the participants 
of either selected development project and there­
fore played no role in persuading farmers. 
Question: Were [the products and techniques being diffused] 
adequate to the stage of technological, economic, 
and social development in the nation? 
Answer : A. Khanewal 
To the planners of the Khanewal project the 
answer to this question appeared to be affirmative 
for the following reasons : 
1. The Punjab was the breadbasket of Pakistan 
and this project would mean thousands less 
tons of wheat would have to be imported. 
2. The new innovations and techniques would 
mean better plowed fields and less work for 
the farmer. 
130 
3. Some of the innovations and techniques had 
been especially adapted for the country 
(Mexi-pak wheat seed). 
4. An already established social structure was 
available through which to disseminate the 
new products and techniques. 
However, in terms of technical education, tech­
nical communication, and infrastructure support 
systems, the nation was inadequate. 
B. Comilla 
The Comilla project focused on providing the 
participants with the needed support systems and 
technical education. It did not matter to the 
planners whether or not the nation was in an ade­
quate situation or not. The project was essen­
tially designed to be self-supporting, and would 
progress as rapidly or as slowly in technical, 
economic, and social terms as the participants 
desired. Some pressure was applied by the Academy 
staff, but it appeared to have been stimulating 
rather than stifling. 
Question; [Did the new innovations! require the establish­
ment of new systems of credit, land tenure, tech­
nical assistance, marketing, and insurance? 
Answer; A. Khanewal 
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The Khanewal project required the establishment 
of a new system of increased technical assistance. 
The project was designed to work within the exist­
ing credit, land tenure, and marketing systems. 
B. Comilla 
The rural development schemes of the Comilla 
project were designed to make the farmers aware of 
innovative economic, political, and social activi­
ties that were adaptable or specifically created 
for their local culture. In addition, these pro­
grams were designed to introduce new technology to 
the farmers. 
Question: How adequate were the communication channels' con­
tent and treatment of the innovation in relation 
to the needs of the farmers? 
Answer: A. Khanewal 
The communication channels' (the CCFU staff) 
content and treatment of the innovations in rela­
tion to the needs of the farmers was extremely 
poor. For example, there was little, if any, 
warning of the tractors' arrival; no discussions 
were held so that the farmers could learn of the 
tractors' or the new seed variety's positive 
potential; no technical training was conducted; a 
feedback channel through which villagers could ex­
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press concerns was not established. 
B. Comilla 
The communication channels' (Academy staff) 
content and treatment of the innovations in rela­
tion to the needs of the farmers was excellent. 
The entire project was based upon continuous two-
way communication between the Academy staff and 
the villagers. 
Category VI; Sociological 
Question: How was the rural social structure organized, and 
what influence did it exert over individual de­
cision-making? 
Answer: A. Khanewal 
The rural social structure for the participants 
of the Khanewal project centered around a village 
headman, an informal position. He was usually 
also the president of the village Cooperative, but 
when these positions were held by two different 
men, conflict was common. A third influential 
figure in the village was the Cooperative manager. 
Although usually an outsider, because he was a 
government employee, the Cooperative manager could 
more easily coerce the farmers than could either 
of the previously mentioned leaders. A fourth in­
fluential figure was the village imam, or religious 
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leader. This person, however, rarely became in­
volved in conflicts unless directly related to the 
Moslem religion. Generally, the older a person 
was, the greater was the deference paid him, but 
this did not mean he was automatically sought as a 
figure of authority. All women in the village were 
in purdah and did not seem to have much influence 
even behind the scenes. 
B. Comilla 
In most East Pakistan villages a few prominent 
families could be found that had been directing 
the village for decades. Representatives from 
these families (usually the elders) formed an in­
formal village council. It was this council that 
made the social, judicial, and often even the 
political decisions for the entire village. 
However, this system was weakening because of 
modernizing influences and the presence of numer­
ous factions. Replacing this council in many vil­
lages participating in the Comilla project were 
the organizers, model farmers, and managers that 
were trained by the Academy staff. One of the 
major innovations of the Comilla project was the 
training of individual local leaders. 
Question: Who decided what kinds of innovations would be 
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diffused and developed? 
Answer : A. Khanewal 
On a descending order of influence: the nation­
al government; the provincial government; the dis­
trict government; the CCFU staff; and the vil­
lagers . 
B. Comilla 
For the most part, the villagers of the Comilla 
project themselves, with the support of the 
Pakistan Academy for Rural Development, decided on 
the kinds of innovations that were developed and 
diffused. 
Question: What effects did the adoption of certain innova­
tions have on individual and family welfare: 
Answer: A. Khanewal 
The farmers produced more wheat as a result of 
the introduction of the new seed varieties, in­
creased use of fertilizer and irrigation water, 
and tractor-plowed land. This surplus crop pro­
vided increased welfare to the farmer's family in 
terms of increased food or cash. 
B. Comilla 
Rice yields were moderately increased by 
seedbed preparation, line sowing, weeding, 
more fertilizer, and better insect control; 
rice prices to the farmers were raised by 
cooperatively keeping the crop off the 
135 
market in the low-price harvest season; 
production credit was secured at less than 
a third of the annual cost formerly pre­
vailing; encumbered land was redeemed from 
the moneylenders as debts owed them were 
paid with cooperative loans. Family in­
comes and levels of living began to rise as 
production increased, prices improved and the 
debt burden shrank. (Raper, 1970, p. 271) 
Question: What kind of living and learning adjustments did 
the innovations require from the farmers? 
Answer: Both projects required that new living and learning 
techniques be developed for the innovations to be 
successful. The difference between the two proj­
ects was that in the Khanewal project the farmers 
resisted the new techniques, while in the Comilla 
project the farmers readily accepted the new tech­
niques . 
Question: Who controlled the sources and channels of communi­
cation for the innovations? 
Answer : A. Khanewal 
The national government, both directly and 
through the CCFU staff in Khanewal, controlled the 
sources and channels of communication for the 
innovations. 
B. Comilla 
For the most part, the Pakistan Academy for 
Rural Development controlled the sources and 
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Question : 
Answer : 
Question: 
Answer : 
channels of communication for the innovations. 
[Was mass communication] at the service of all the 
farmers or mainly at the service of the government, 
the input industries, the buyers of farm products, 
the larger farmers, the consumer groups? 
Given the isolation of the villages, the large 
number of illiterate persons in these villages, 
the primary use of radio (for pleasure), and the 
almost complete lack of other electronic mass 
communication devices in the villages within both 
of the selected projects, neither could be said to 
have benefitted from the mass communication systems 
of either East or West Pakistan. 
Which were the institutions that directly or in­
directly transferred technology to the farmers? 
A. Khanewal 
Direct Indirect 
CCFU Water and Power Development 
Department of Basic 
Democracies 
American Peace Corps 
Administration (WAPDA) 
Ministry of Agriculture 
Agriculture Extension 
Service 
B, Comilla 
Direct Indirect 
Pakistan Academy for Department of Basic 
Rural Development Democracies 
Department of Agriculture 
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What . . . conditions affected the continued avail­
ability of auxiliary technologies? 
In both projects the major condition that affected 
the continual availability of auxiliary technolo­
gies was the support of the national government. 
It was the national government that developed, 
transferred, or secured the required auxiliary 
technologies, either directly or indirectly through 
the CCFU or PARD. 
Category VII; Technical 
Question: Did [farmers] own their agricultural tools? 
Answer: A. Khanewal 
Individual farmers owned all of the tools neces­
sary to prepare the land for flood irrigation and 
planting, and for harvesting the crop in the 
traditional manner. The tractors and implements 
were owned jointly by individual village coopera­
tives . 
B. Comilla 
The farmers in the Comilla project individually 
owned the tools necessary to farm their crops in 
the traditional manner. The tractors, however, 
were the property of the Department of Agricul­
ture, on loan to the project through the auspices 
of the Central Cooperative Association (KTCCA). 
Question: 
Answer : 
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Question: How appropriate and well-proven were the products 
and techniques being diffused? 
Answer : A. Khanewal 
The appropriateness of the products and tech­
niques in the Khanewal project was mixed. For 
example, the new varieties of wheat had been spe­
cially developed from a Mexican variety to fit the 
climate and environmental conditions of Pakistan. 
The fertilizer was also appropriate and had proven 
its usefulness. On the other hand, the tractors 
had not been proven useful and it was the opinion 
of many that they were inappropriate for the social 
as well as the environmental conditions of the 
Khanewal project. 
B. Comilla 
In the Comilla project fewer products and tech­
niques had prior testing. However, the Comilla 
project included a large experimental component, 
both actual and attitudinal. Therefore, many 
products and techniques were tested on site. If 
they were successful they were retained. If they 
were unsuccessful, they were discarded and another 
product or technique was tried. 
Question: Was technification promoted and executed without 
efforts for simultaneous [human development]? 
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Answer : A. Khanewal 
Yes. During the introduction of both the im­
proved wheat varieties and the use of tractors, no 
attempt was made to inform the villagers of the 
positive potential of these innovations. Nor was 
an effort made to educate them to even a basic 
understanding of things mechanical. 
B. Comilla 
No. The Comilla project was based on two 
assumptions. The first was that progress depended 
upon the willingness of the villagers to be in­
novative. The second assumption was that once the 
villagers adopted a small innovation and realized 
its success, they would be likely to accept larger, 
more complicated innovations leading to major 
change. 
Question: What auxiliary technologies were needed to render 
the use of the proposed technology viable? 
Answer : Using the case of the introduction of tractors in 
both rural development projects, maintenance and 
repair equipment and technicians; local fuel 
supply ; technical training facilities ; communica­
tion media and personnel to promote and explain 
tractor usefulness; storage and a marketing system 
for the increased harvest; and additional water 
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and fertilizer were all required to render the use 
of the proposed technology viable. 
Question: From whom was [the proposed technology] obtained, 
an external or an internal source? 
Answer; A. Khanewal 
With the exception of the tractors and their 
implements, the initial supply of new seed 
varieties and Peace Corps Volunteers, other tech­
nical procurement was done on a local basis. 
B. Comilla 
Some of the early project equipment was procured 
through the Columbo Plan, and Peace Corps Volun­
teers were utilized initially. Beyond that, in­
ternal sources provided the remaining technical 
necessities. 
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CHAPTER V. FINDINGS 
Introduction 
Many international development experts involved in rural 
development projects had at the foundation of their projects, 
two basic assumptions. The first assumption was that devel­
opment projects were multifaceted. The second assumption was 
that the success of such programs depended upon the partici­
pants ' ability to identify the various factors involved and to 
take into account the interactions between and the contribu­
tions made by each factor. 
From these assumptions, three propositions were put 
forth. They were : 
1. During the planning and operation of a successful 
development project the many relevant dimensions would have 
been taken into account. 
2. During the planning and operation of a development 
project that was eventually deemed unsuccessful, some of the 
relevant dimensions would have been ignored. 
3. A proper accounting of the many dimensions of a 
development project could only be made using an interdisci­
plinary methodology. 
To verify the first proposition, a case study of a rec­
ognized successful development project, the Comilla Project, 
was developed and analyzed. To verify the second proposition, 
a case study of an unsuccessful development project, the 
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Khanewal project, was developed and analyzed. To verify the 
third proposition, the two case studies were analyzed using a 
set of interdisciplinary questions that had been adapted from 
Bordenave's model for making interdisciplinary analyses. 
Proposition 1 
During the planning and operation of a successful 
development project the many relevant dimensions 
would have been taken into account. 
The Pakistan Academy for Rural Development (PARD), 
Comilla, the developer of the Comilla project was founded on 
an interdisciplinary principle. Its purpose was to apply 
social science principles to public administration and to 
conduct research on the social and economic problems of rural 
areas. The program in Comilla was PARD's pilot project em­
phasizing interdisciplinary development. 
From the very outset of the project, the social, cul­
tural , and psychological aspects were taken into considera­
tion by the developers. As was the case with most develop­
ment projects, the project developers did not begin by telling 
the villagers how to solve their problems. Rather, the de­
velopers began by listening to the villagers, asking them what 
their problems were and what the villagers thought was needed 
to rectify the situation. The project developers' next steps 
were to develop local leadership and to establish a two-way 
communication system between the villagers and the Academy. 
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The leaders chosen by the farmers themselves, served as the 
communication link. 
The project developers also introduced the new, innova­
tive practices slowly, beginning with the less complicated 
techniques and advancing slowly to the more complicated 
ideas. The developers also adapted their transferred tech­
nology or innovation to the local setting, taking care to in­
corporate it successfully into the local social structure. 
Finally, the project developers made certain that the vil­
lagers participated in the problem-solving sessions whenever 
difficulties developed. 
The project developers' realization of the multifaceted 
dimension of the project was also seen by the diversity of 
their schemes. Each of the six major schemes initiated by 
PARD was aimed at a different segment of rural life. One 
scheme was directed toward the formation of agricultural co­
operatives, a second toward technical training, a third to­
ward rural public works, a fourth toward irrigation water, a 
fifth toward a women's program and family planning, and the 
sixth toward rural education. Not only were these schemes 
initiated by the Academy, they were also coordinated with 
one another, to keep conflicting interests at a minimum. 
When the agricultural cooperative scheme was analyzed in 
depth using Bordenave's series of interdisciplinary questions 
it was apparent that the project developers had taken into 
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account all of the relevant dimensions. For example, when 
answering those questions related to culture, it was found 
that the PARD officials effectively utilized local conditions. 
They capitalized on the weakening effectiveness of local 
councils by training new leaders; they paced their project on 
the recognized level of local innovativeness; they set up an 
effective two-way verbal communication system that did not 
require sophisticated technology; and most importantly, the 
project developers allowed the project to be directed inter­
nally, by the villagers themselves, thus automatically elim­
inating the chance of bringing into the system an innovation 
that would be culturally abhorrent to the villagers. 
When answering Borderiave's questions related to economics 
it was found that the majority of the villagers involved in 
the scheme did own their land, although usually it was less 
than five acres and was usually mortgaged at the outset of the 
project. One of the project's major thrusts was to aid the 
economic plight of the local villagers, and they accomplished 
this goal by a variety of means. They included: 
(1) to promote a savings program; 
(2) to provide farmers with low-interest loans for the 
purchase of crop inputs ; 
(3) to form new marketing systems whereby the 
crops were sold collectively rather than by each individual 
farmer ; 
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(4) to promote e-nployment ; 
(5) to help slow the urban migration in the area; 
(6) to aid in the redistribution of wealth by making 
cash available to former subsistance farmers. 
Regarding the education category of Bordenave * s series of 
questions, it was found that the project developers had taken 
this area into consideration. For example, emphasis was 
placed on training selected farmers to serve as the project's 
extension agents. And those Academy staff members who were 
from outside the area, were given special training designed 
to acquaint them to the local conditions, The villagers were 
encouraged to solve their own problems, using the Academy 
staff as resource persons rather than persons who would tell 
them what to do. Verbal communication was the communication 
mode the Academy staff relied on because the villagers had so 
few other communication devices and so little experience with 
other communication systems. This was an effective communi­
cation channel under those circumstances. 
Politics entered the project in both a positive and a 
negative way. On the positive side, it was noted that the 
project was a government-sponsored scheme designed to aid the 
common welfare of the people. The project's major goals were 
to develop methodologies and techniques for modernizing the 
farming practices of the subsistence farmer, to improve the 
purchasing, marketing, and other economic activities, to 
formulate pressure groups to help regulate the local commun-
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ity, and to generally upgrade the standard of living of the 
local farmers. In addition, it was anticipated that these 
newly developed methods and techniques would be adaptable to 
other regions throughout the country. 
On the negative side was that the government retained 
almost complete control of the communication system to the 
outside world. With electronic media almost non-existent, 
with literacy at about the 20% level, and few outside visi­
tors so that even verbal communications were almost exclu­
sively with government officials (PARD staff), there was 
virtually no way for the local villager to receive unbiased 
news. However, since the project outcome was not dependent 
upon outside communications, this was not a factor. 
The psychological element of the project was recognized 
by the Academy staff in that they did not attempt to coerce 
the villagers into trying the new methods. As noted earlier, 
they took great care to have the farmers totally involved in 
the project, especially in the leadership, problem-solving, 
and decision-making areas. The various innovations themselves 
were designed to be easily adaptable into the culture and 
social structure, and easy for the villagers to comprehend why 
a change was being made. 
The sociological dimension of the Comilla project was 
its strongest area. Many of the positive aspects of the proj­
ect that have already been mentioned, also had sociological 
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overtones or components. For example, the replacing of the 
council members with the newly trained local leaders was a 
social as well as a cultural activity. The use of these local 
leaders, who were totally familiar with local customs and 
local ways, not to mention the idiosyncracies of the local 
people, as change agents gave the project a strong local im­
petus. The emphasis on local decision-making and problem-
solving also helped to incorporate the project into the social 
structure. Of course, the major goal of the project was to 
upgrade the family welfare of the local villagers by applying 
the principles of social science to public administration, and 
to research local social and economic problems. 
The technical aspects of the project were also given much 
consideration. One of the most important technical considera­
tions was the complexity of the innovation. The project 
developers always introduced a new innovation by using the 
most easily understood concepts. They then progressed slowly 
to the more complicated concepts. Accompanying the intro­
duction of the new innovation were stated reasons why it was 
better than the old method as well as a provision for neces­
sary technical training in the operation, care, and mainten­
ance of the technical apparatus. 
However, the introduction of the technical hardware was 
not seen as the ultimate reason for the project's existence. 
As noted earlier, the welfare of the village families was the 
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major concern. The technical devices were simply one means 
of acquiring improved family welfare. 
Proposition 2 
During the planning and operation of a development 
project that was eventually deemed unsuccessful, 
some of the relevant dimensions would have been 
ignored. 
The planners of the Khanewal project had good reasons 
for developing the project as they did. The country was in 
desperate need of more food, particularly wheat; the Punjab 
was the breadbasket of the nation; bullock or water buffalo 
fodder crops were utilizing 1/3 to 1/2 of the total land under 
cultivation in the area; land cultivation practices had not 
essentially been changed for 2000 years; modern technology 
was required for land reclamation. It seemed that the intro­
duction of high-yielding seed varieties and modem tractors 
would serve the dual purpose of modernizing the farm sector 
while dramatically increasing the yields per acre, and the 
acreage under cultivation. 
However, the farmers had a number of counter reasons that 
appeared to show that the project was not what they needed at 
that time. In the first place they utilized the bullock for 
many things other than plowing; they did not understand the 
need for or how the tractors would benefit them; they dis­
liked the wheat the new varieties produced; and the short 
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stem of the wheat deprived them of part of their fodder crop. 
One of the errors made by the Khanewal project developers 
was to disregard the farmers' complaints. They failed to see 
or understand the social, psychological, educational, cul­
tural, economic, and even some technical aspects of the proj­
ect that needed to be solved before the project could begin 
to operate with a minimum of success. Rather than face the 
problems and solve them jointly with the villagers, the proj­
ect planners chose instead to force the project on the 
farmers. The planners saw the farmers' resistance to the 
project's innovations as being an indication of their back­
wardness, called them lazy, and considered them socially and 
intellectually inferior. 
The extent to which the project developers failed to re­
cognize the relevant dimensions of the project was seen when 
the project was analyzed using Bordenave's set of interdisci­
plinary questions. For example, regarding the cultural di­
mensions of the project, the planners ignored that the vil­
lagers found the wheat hard to grind, difficult to make 
chupattis with, and not as good tasting as the old varieties. 
They also ignored or were not cognizant that the buffalo was 
also used as a food source (its milk and meat), as a beast of 
burden, and as a fuel source (its dried dung). 
In addition to these problems, the project planners 
chose to ignore the local leadership which had developed over 
the years. Instead of looking to these leaders to support 
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their projects they instead brought in their own bureaucratic 
structure to each individual village in the form of a village 
manager. These managers had no place in the local culture or 
social organization. Consequently, they proceeded to provide 
additional irritation to the local farmers. 
Economically, thé Khanewal project had both a positive 
and a negative effect. The project did promote employment, 
and thus, slow the migration to urban areas. It also aided in 
the redistribution of wealth by allowing subsistence farmers 
to acquire cash from their surplus crops. On the negative 
side of the economic picture, the farmers technically did not 
own their land. They could farm the land in perpetuity but 
they could not sell it nor could they divide it among their 
sons. The 12 1/2 acres had to remain intact. Consequently, 
the farmers never really felt the land was theirs, and many 
believed that once the land became highly productive, that the 
government would take it over. Others believed that if they 
did not do what the government demanded, that they would lose 
the land. 
Also on the negative side of the economic dimension, the 
CCFU and the national government controlled all of the market 
prices, the surplus crops being sold as well as the cash 
crops. They also jointly controlled the sale of seed and 
fertilizer, setting the price as well as the amount that could 
be purchased by any one farmer. In addition, the government 
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controlled the amount and cost of the irrigation water that 
the farmers required to grow their crops. 
The developers of the Khanewal project also failed to 
consider many educational aspects of the project. For ex­
ample, although the change agents working in the project were 
technically competent, they were inadequately prepared to work 
in the local environment. They felt the farmers were socially 
and intellectually inferior and thought that being educated 
meant that they never got their hands dirty or participated in 
hard, manual labor. 
The project developers also failed to initiate any pro­
grams in which the farmers could make their own decisions or 
participate in the problem-solving process. Consequently, the 
villagers had little knowledge of outside resources or places 
where they could go for lack of communication sources avail­
able to the local villagers. Less than 20% of the villagers 
were literate, electronic media was virtually unknown, and 
visitors were rare. The result was that the villagers had 
little knowledge of modern technical innovations, and few 
ways of learning about them. 
Politically, the project was designed to aid the family 
welfare of the local farmer and to aid in the lowering of 
food prices in urban areas. If effective, both goals would 
have given strength to the political party then in office. 
However, the two goals were somewhat conflicting, since lower 
food prices would have a negative effect on rural family wel­
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fare, and higher rural family welfare meant higher urban food 
prices. 
With the government controlling the markets, the neces­
sary crop inputs, the little communication there was with the 
outside world, and strongly advocating a project that the 
farmers disliked intensely, the politicians in power at the 
time found few friends in the villages of Khanewal. 
Regarding the psychological dimension of the project, it 
was found that the coercive aspects helped to create in the 
villagers a negative attitude toward the goals, objectives, 
and personnel of the project. The villagers felt that the 
project was being forced upon them and that they had no voice 
in the decision-making process. Further, when the villagers 
did make the attempt to voice their opinion, it was ignored. 
Examples of this were seen when they petitioned to have the 
tractors removed and again when they wanted to have the young 
men of their villages trained to be the drivers of their 
tractors. 
Also, the CCFU managers in each of the villages, in­
stead of attempting to integrate themselves and their duties 
into the local societal structures, chose to remain aloof 
from it. This helped to create feelings of competition, mis­
trust, and conflict. The villagers felt they had to choose 
between two factions, that they could not remain neutral. 
Finally, the project did very little to satisfy the 
villagers' "need to know." In many instances the villagers 
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did not even know that the tractors were coining. When the 
tractors did arrive, no one explained how the tractors could 
be beneficially used, or how they functioned, or needed to 
be maintained. This failure on the part of the project 
planners helped to increase the well-recognized psychological 
reaction of mistrusting and do;m-grading things that are not 
understood. 
When answering Bordenave's questions related to the 
social dimension of the project it was found that the in­
creased wheat yield from most farmers' fields did increase 
the welfare of most village families. It also provided a 
source of badly needed cash for the subsistence farmer. How­
ever, the project created much conflict within the local 
social structure. In essence, the project planners rejected 
the local social system, assuming it to be inadequate for 
undertaking and supervising the project's activities. The 
planners also did nothing to rectify this feeling since they 
neglected to train a local leadership or to allow for local 
participation in the decision-making and problem-solving 
processes related to the project. 
The findings related to the technical dimensions of the 
Khanewal project were also voiced. The new varieties of 
short stemmed, high-yielding wheat that were introduced had 
been specifically developed for the local environment. But 
it did require greater technical inputs in terms of well-pre­
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pared land, commercial fertilizers, and increased use of 
irrigation water. The failure of the project developers to 
adequately relate this technical information to the villagers 
helped to ensure the failure of the project. 
The greatest technical failure of the project, however, 
was the tractors themselves. Although the tractors were pur­
chased from two different companies for purposes of compari­
son, no experimentation took place prior to their purchase re­
garding the tractors' ability to withstand the extraordinary 
local environmental conditions. These conditions included 
an extreme amount of dust, temperatures commonly above 110® F, 
a heavy, clay-base soil that dried brick-hard, and inade­
quate maintenance support and repair facilities. Coupled 
with the unavailability of trained drivers and mechanics, 
these extreme environmental conditions resulted in many tech­
nical difficulties. 
Proposition 3 
A proper accounting of the many dimensions of a 
development project could only be made using an 
interdisciplinary methodology. 
Two major assumptions made by development planners who 
advocate an interdisciplinary method for development projects 
were verified during this study. The first was verified by 
finding that there were many dimensions in each of the 
selected Pakistani rural development projects. Seven spe­
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cific categories were identified—cultural, economic, educa­
tional, political, psychological, sociological, and tech­
nical. In addition, an eighth category, communication, was 
found to be an important element in each of the recognized 
categories. 
The second assumption verified during this study was 
that the various dimensions of a development project were 
interrelated. The interrelatedness, and the need to take it 
into consideration du.ing the formation of a development proj­
ect, was witnessed many times during the comparison of the 
two projects examined in this study. It was difficult to 
imagine how these many dimensions and their interrelation­
ships could be identified without using an interdisciplinary 
methodology. 
In summation, the case studies of the selected rural 
development projects were analyzed to discern their account­
ability toward the project's cultural, economic, educational, 
political, psychological, social, and technical dimensions. 
Regarding the first proposition, it was found that in the 
Comilla project, used to exemplify a successful development 
project, the relevant dimensions had been taken into account. 
Regarding the second proposition, it was found that in the 
Khanewal project, many of the relevant dimensions had not been 
taken into account. Regarding the third proposition, it was 
found that because of the number of dimensions involved in a 
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development project and their interrelationships, a proper 
accounting of a development project could only be made using 
an interdisciplinary methodology. 
157 
CHAPTER VI. SUMMARY, CONCLUSIONS, AND RECOMMENDATIONS 
Summary 
Statement of the problem 
The problem of this study was to analyze a farm mechan­
ization project conducted in the Punjab region of West 
Pakistan and an integrated rural development project con­
ducted in the Comilla thana of East Pakistan, using an inter­
disciplinary methodology. 
Purpose of the study 
The purpose of this study was threefold: 
1. to discern the successful and unsuccessful elements 
of the specified rural development projects and the reasons 
behind their success or failure; 
2. to ascertain if elements of an interdisciplinary 
approach could be recognized as having been incorporated 
within each project's design and implementation; 
3. to explore linkages between the success or failure 
of a project and the incorporation of a multidimensional 
aspect within the project. 
Propositions of the study 
The propositions put forth in this study were directly 
related to the purposes of the study. They were: 
1. During the planning and operation of a successful 
development project the many relevant dimensions would have 
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been taken into account. 
2. During the planning and operation of a development 
project that was eventually deemed unsuccessful, some of the 
relevant dimensions would have been ignored. 
3. A proper accounting of the many dimensions of a 
development project could only be made using an interdisci­
plinary methodology. 
Reviews of literature 
Three reviews of literature were undertaken during the 
course of this study. The first review was conducted to dis­
cern the different approaches to interdisciplinary develop­
ment that were being advocated by various development ex­
perts. The other two reviews were conducted to ascertain the 
settings within which the two selected rural development proj­
ects were undertaken, as well as to discover the planning 
and implementation procedures of the projects themselves. 
Government documents, relevant periodicals and journals, case 
studies, research reports, unpublished Ph.D. dissertations, 
and general texts were studied during each of the reviews of 
literature. 
During the review of literature regarding the various 
approaches to interdisciplinary development it was revealed 
that the call for an interdisciplinary approach to develop­
ment had been made as early as 1958 by Hirschman. The inter­
disciplinary approaches put forth by development experts since 
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1958 were many and varied. Most of their approaches, although 
interdisciplinary overall, still emphasized a particular 
dimension of development. These emphasized dimensions in­
cluded communications, socio-cultural, educational, political, 
psychological, and technical. Those experts emphasizing the 
economic dimension of development while advocating an inter­
disciplinary approach, claimed that economics was being over­
emphasized in development planning and analysis. However, 
the majority of writings found in the relevant literature de­
picted single-discipline, economic-oriented studies, ap­
proaches, and analysis of LDC development projects. 
Case studies were developed with the information ac­
quired from reviews of literature. One case study was of the 
Khanewal Rural Development Project undertaken in the Punjab 
Region of the former Province of West Pakistan (now Pakistan). 
The second case study was of the Comilla Rural Development 
Project undertaken in the Comilla District of the former 
Province of East Pakistan (now Bangladesh). 
Case studies 
The Khanewal Project West Pakistan's economy was 
overwhelmingly dependent upon agriculture; more than 45% of 
the provincial income was derived from agriculture; approxi­
mately 60% of the workforce was employed in agriculture; 
virtually all of West Pakistan's exports were agriculture-
related; much of the government's revenue was derived from 
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taxes on land under cultivation and the products produced 
there; even the industrial sector was largely dependent upon 
agricultural products. The major crops grown were wheat, 
cotton, rice, millet, sugar cane, and tobacco. 
Despite the importance of agriculture in West Pakistan, 
it lagged behind the rest of the economy, mainly because the 
industrial sector was receiving much of the economic and 
technical assistance provided by various local, national, 
and international support agencies. Major problems in the 
agricultural sector included salinity and water-logged land, 
an inadequate supply of chemical fertilizers, insufficient 
irrigation water in many areas, poor seed, inadequate tech­
nical support, and unequal land distribution. 
During the late 1950's, the neglect of the agriculture 
sector, a rapidly expanding population, and a drought, com­
bined to cause a serious food shortage in Pakistan. Pakistani 
development planners in the early I960's suggested that wheat 
production in the Punjab region could be significantly in­
creased if the preparation and cultivation of the land were 
mechanized. Their reasons for choosing this area were: 
1. The Punjab was the nation's breadbasket. 
2. The farmers were currently cultivating their land 
using water buffalo as their power source. From 1/3 to 1/2 
of the land under cultivation was being devoted to fodder 
crops for the buffalo. 
3. The primitive wooden plow being used by Punjabi 
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farmers did little more than scratch the surface of the local, 
heavy clay base soil, thus much of the scarce irrigation water 
evaporated instead of soaking into the ground. 
4. It was hypothesized that much of the land already 
lost to salinity and water-logging could be reclaimed during 
the off-season through a process of repeated heavy irrigation 
and deep plowing. 
5. The newly developed high-yielding, short stem vari­
eties of wheat were susceptible to improperly prepared land. 
6. The cooperative unions, a well-established local in­
frastructure was available to disperse the tractors and 
collect payments. 
As a pilot project, the Government of Pakistan purchased 
50 John Deere Lanz diesel engine farm tractors from Germany 
and 50 International Harvester diesel engine farm tractors 
from England. The tractors and accompanying implements were 
distributed throughout the Punjab region under the auspices 
of the Colony Cooperative Farming Union (CCFU). 
From the very beginning the tractors were not well re­
ceived by the villagers. First the Pakistani planners never 
involved the villagers in the project planning. Many vil­
lagers never knew the tractors were even coming until they 
actually arrived. Therefore, many villagers felt the trac­
tors were being forced on them. A second problem also arose 
from the lack of village involvement; no one had prepared 
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the villagers in understanding how the tractor might be 
beneficial. Third, the villagers disliked the idea of having 
to give up their buffalo since it performed many other ser­
vices besides being a draft animal. Fourth, the tractors 
meant a new and unexpected financial burden at a time when 
the villagers were only a few years away from paying off their 
land debts. Fifth, the villagers saw the tractors as a 
weapon used by the cooperative union to accelerate the intro­
duction of another technological innovation they were not 
particularly fond of--high-yielding, short stemmed varieties 
of wheat. 
When the farmers did attempt to use the tractors (re­
gardless of their opposition, they could not afford not to 
use them) the following technical flaws became apparent: 
1. The tractor drivers the CCFU assigned to each trac­
tor were uniformly unskilled in proper cultivation and trac­
tor maintenance procedures. 
2. The implements which accompanied the tractors were 
not suitable for working quarter-acre plots of land. 
3. The closest fuel supply was from 20 to 40 miles 
away. 
4. There were no repair shops, trained mechanics, or 
tools and equipment to make major or minor repairs. 
One, or a combination of these flaws, resulted in nearly 
90% of the tractors being in a state of disrepair within the 
first six months. Despite the villagers petitions to have 
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the tractors withdrawn, the CCFU attempted to correct some of 
the project flaws. But it took a great deal of time and 
money. All the villagers saw was an increasing financial bur­
den with no real return. Consequently, the tractors and 
everyone associated with them were met with increased hostil­
ity; some farmers refused to use the tractors, while others 
continued to use them only under duress. The Khanewal proj­
ect continued to function in this environment until govern­
ment support was dropped in 1973. 
The Comilla project East Pakistan's economy was 
also extremely dependent upon agriculture. Nearly 95% of the 
Province's population lived in rural areas, which produced 
95% of the value of exports and was responsible for some 70% 
of the annual gross domestic product (GDP). Despite this 
importance, for the first three five-year plans. East 
Pakistan's agricultural sector was awarded only 17% of the 
Province's total investment allocations. 
In sharp contrast with this rather negative attitude to­
ward rural development was the establishment of the Pakistan 
Academy for Rural Development (PARD) in Comilla. Opened in 
1959, the Academy's first director was Akhter Hameed Khan, who 
dedicated PARD to the application of social science principles 
to public administration and to do research on village social 
and economic problems. 
Two assumptions were made by the Comilla Academy staff 
regarding the requirements for successful rural development. 
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The first assumption was that progress depended upon the 
willingness of the villagers to be innovative. The second 
assumption was that once the villagers adopted a small in­
novation and realized its success, that they would be more 
likely to accept larger, more complicated innovations leading 
to major change. Consequently, the rural development proj­
ects that emanated from the Academy were designed to make 
the farmers aware of innovative economic, political, and 
social activities that were adaptable to or specifically 
created for their local culture. 
From 1959 through 1971, six major experiments or pilot 
projects were undertaken by the Comilla Academy. They were 
the agricultural cooperatives, the Thana Training and Devel­
opment Center, the rural public works program, the thana 
irrigation program, the women's program and family planning, 
and the rural education experiments. Because of its similari­
ties to the Khanewal project in West Pakistan, the agricul­
tural cooperative project was examined in depth. 
To formulate their development strategy. Khan and his 
staff met with individual farmers, village groups, and local 
leaders. These informal consultations, in conjunction with 
surveying actual village conditions, led to the formulation of 
six basic hypotheses: 
1. A viable private economic organization was needed. 
2. The village would be recognized as the basic unit. 
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3. Linkages were needed between the villages and the 
Academy. 
4. The training methodology would involve model farmers 
going to the Academy for instruction and returning to the 
village to relay the information learned to the other partici­
pating villagers. 
5. The early technical inputs would be provided by a 
team of Japanese experts working under the auspices of the 
Columbo Plan. 
6. Early emphasis would be given to simple techniques 
with the more complicated ones left for a later time. 
The village cooperative system had two key persons at its 
core. One was called an organizer whose function was to serve 
as liaison between the village cooperative society and the 
Academy. The second key person was the model farmer who 
served as the local agricultural extension agent. Later, in 
many villages the organizer and model farmer positions were 
combined into a single position of manager. 
By mid-1960, seven village-based cooperatives had been 
formed in addition to a vegetable growers society, a women's 
cooperative, and a weavers cooperative. By 1970, over 300 
agricultural cooperatives were operating in the Comilla 
thana. Virtually all of the cooperative members were farmers 
whose landholdings were five acres or less. 
In January, 1962, the Kotwali Thana Central Cooperative 
Association (KTCCA) was formed. The Association's function 
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was to support the activities of the local cooperatives by 
providing services that individual cooperatives could not 
provide and to serve as a cohesive coordinating unit. In 
addition, the KTCCA was to provide general rules and regula­
tions, discipline, training, and credit. 
Among the first projects supported by the KTCCA was the 
training of drivers for tractors assigned to PARD by the 
Department of Agriculture. Originally, the introduction of 
tractors produced little interest among the farmers. Within 
a short time, however, having witnessed cultivation demon­
strations and having heard positive reactions from the farmers 
who had used the tractors, the villagers began to request the 
tractors for their fields. 
But the project was not without its faults. To keep the 
two tractors from spending most of their time driving from 
one village to another, the Academy required that at least 
five farmers from the same village, having a minimum of eight 
contiguous acres, jointly request the tractors before allow­
ing the tractors to go to a village. In addition, the plots 
of land owned by each individual farmer were too small to be 
economically plowed with a tractor. The farmers, therefore, 
were required to plan cooperatively to get the tractors to 
the village, and then allow the tractors to plow contiguous 
lands as one large plot instead of individually, efforts 
entirely new to their custom. By being allowed to work out 
the details of these new innovations themselves, the vil-
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lagers were able to more readily accept the new ideas. 
The Comilla project continued to function until 1971 
when the Province of East Pakistan seceHed from Pakistan 
and formed the independent nation of Bangladesh. 
Analysis 
An interdisciplinary technique was formulated to analyze 
the specific data within the case studies. This technique 
consisted of applying a series of 39 questions regarding the 
design, organization, and functions of the selected rural 
development projects. The questions were adapted from D. 
Bordenave's "Communication of Agricultural Innovations in 
Latin America: The Need for New Models," in Communie at ions 
Research, Volume 3, 1976, and P. Hill's "Diffusion of In­
novation qua Transfer of Technology: Critique, Comments, and 
Recommendationsan unpublished casual paper. Journalism 
Department, Iowa State University, 1976. 
The 39 questions were clustered into seven categories— 
cultural, economic, educational, political, psychological, 
sociological, and technical. When data related to a partic­
ular question could not be found in the case study, a thor­
ough search of relevant literature was conducted in an attempt 
to adequately answer each question. 
Findings 
The findings of the study were directly related to the 
three propositions put forth: 
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Proposition 1. The analysis of the Comilla project was 
used to verify the first proposition regarding a successful 
development project. When the agricultural cooperative scheme 
was analyzed in depth using Bordenave's series of interdisci­
plinary questions it was found that the project developers had 
taken into account all of the relevant dimensions. 
For example, when answering those questions related to 
culture, it was found that the PARD officials utilized local 
conditions to enhance the project's effectiveness. When 
answering Bordenave's questions related to economics, it was 
found that one of the project's major thrusts was to aid the 
economic plight of the local subsistence farmer. Regarding 
the education category of Bordenave's questions, it was found 
that emphasis had been placed on the training of selected 
farmers as extension agents, PARD staff was given training to 
understand the local living conditions, technical training 
was emphasized, and the villagers were encouraged to solve 
their own problems whenever possible. 
Politics entered the project in both a positive and a 
negative way. On the positive side was that the government-
sponsored project was designed to upgrade the overall stan­
dard of living of those villagers most in need of assistance, 
the subsistence farmers. On the negative side was that the 
government retained almost complete control of the communica­
tion system to the outside world. The psychological element 
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of the project was recognized by the Academy staff in that 
they did not attempt to coerce the villagers into trying new 
methods, the usefulness of the new innovations were empha­
sized, and the staff took care to involve the villagers in 
every aspect of the project. 
The sociological dimension of the Camilla project was its 
strongest area. The use of local leadership, emphasis on 
local decision-making and problem-solving, as well as the 
major goal of upgrading family welfare all helped to infuse 
the project activities into the local society. The technical 
aspects of the project were also given ample consideration as 
witnessed by the consideration given to the complexity levels 
of the innovations offered, and the technical training that 
correlated with the technical hardware. However, their early 
emphasis on imported foreign technical apparatus and expertise 
was a negative aspect of the project. 
Proposition 2. The analysis of the Khanewal project was 
used to verify the second proposition regarding an unsuccess­
ful development project. When this agricultural cooperative 
scheme was analyzed in depth using Bordenave's series of 
interdisciplinary questions it was found that the project 
developers had taken very few of the relevant dimensions into 
account. For example, regarding the cultural dimensions of 
the project, the planners ignored the villagers' dislike for 
the wheat varieties being introduced and that they used the 
bullocks for many other purposes besides plowing the land. 
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Economically, the Khanewal project had both a positive 
and a negative side. Positively, the project promoted employ­
ment and slowed migration to urban areas, and aided in the re­
distribution of wealth. Negatively, however, the farmers 
felt they would never own their land outright and the govern­
ment controlled the prices of both the input and output mar­
kets. From an educational standpoint the project developers 
failed to educate their staff in the understanding of the 
local conditions, and they failed to educate the villagers in 
the usefulness of the innovations being introduced, in related 
technical education, or in the methods for solving their 
problems themselves. 
Politically, the project had conflicting aspects. It was 
designed to upgrade the welfare of the rural family while 
lowering the urban food prices, an exceedingly difficult task 
in an LDC. In addition, with the government controlling the 
market prices, the crop inputs, and communications, and ad­
vocating a project the farmers disliked intensely, creating a 
positive political situation was virtually impossible. Re­
garding the psychological dimension of the project it was 
found that the project's coercive aspects helped create a 
negative attitude toward the project, as did the presence of 
the CCFU managers, and the failure of the project developers 
to involve the villagers in the project's planning and 
implementation. 
When answering Bordenave's questions related to the 
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social dimension of the project it was found that the standard 
of living in the village was improved somewhat. However, the 
project planners rejected the local social system as a struc­
ture for undertaking and supervising the project's activities. 
The findings related to the technical dimension of the 
Khanewal project were also mixed. The new varieties of wheat 
being introduced had been specifically developed for the local 
environment, but they required supporting technical knowledge 
and increased inputs the villagers rarely had. Also, the 
tractors were not the appropriate technology for the local 
environment. 
Proposition 3. Bordenave's set of interdisciplinary 
questions was used to verify the study's third proposition 
regarding the proper accounting of a development project. 
Two major assumptions were made by the development planners 
who advocated an interdisciplinary method for development 
projects. The first assumption was that there were many 
dimensions to a development project. The second assumption 
was that the various dimensions of a development project were 
interrelated. Both of these assumptions were found to be 
true during the analysis of this study. 
Conclusions 
The conclusions were drawn in relation to the three 
propositions set forth in this study. The first proposition 
stated that during the planning and operation of a successful 
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development project the relevant dimensions would have been 
taken into account. It was found that during the planning 
and implementation of the Comilla project which was used to 
exemplify a successful project, almost all of the dimensions 
had been taken into account. The cultural, economic, educa­
tional, psychological, and social dimensions of the project 
appeared to have been fully emphasized. Some faults were 
found in relation to the political and technical dimensions, 
but they also were found to have had positive aspects as 
well. Therefore, it was concluded that the Comilla project 
confirmed the first proposition. 
The second proposition stated that during the planning 
and operation of a development project that was eventually 
deemed unsuccessful, some of the relevant dimensions would 
have been ignored. It was found that during the planning 
and implementation of the Khanewal project, used to exemplify 
an unsuccessful project, three of the dimensions had not been 
taken into account. Very little evidence was found that 
supported the planners giving any thought to the project's 
educational, psychological, or cultural dimensions. Mixed 
results were found regarding the project's economic, politi­
cal, social, and technical dimensions. Therefore, it was 
concluded that the Khanewal project confirmed the second 
proposition. 
The third proposition stated that a proper accounting of 
the many dimensions of a development project could only be 
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made using an interdisciplinary methodology. Using 
Bordenave's revised set of 39 interdisciplinary questions to 
analyze the two selected rural development projects, it was 
found that each project had numerous interrelated dimensions. 
It was concluded that only by using an interdisciplinary 
methodology could these many interrelated dimensions be fully 
taken into account, thus confirming the third proposition. 
In summary, three major conclusions were made as a 
result of this study. They were as follows: 
1. It was concluded that a sufficient number of relevant 
interdisciplinary dimensions were taken into account 
during the planning and implementation of the Comilla 
Rural Development Project, 
2. It was concluded that the failure to take into 
account the relevant interdisciplinary dimensions of 
a development project, during its planning and im­
plementation stages, decreased the chances for 
successfully integrating innovative practices into 
the target society. 
3. It was concluded that an interdisciplinary method­
ology can provide a proper accounting of the many 
dimensions of a development project. 
Constraints of the Study 
1, The interdisciplinary methodology used to analyze the 
two case studies developed during the research was 
adapted from the works of Bordenave and P. Hill. 
2. The research revealed that the project used to exem­
plify a successful development project (the Comilla 
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Project) was developed using an interdisciplinary 
technique. 
Recommendations 
This study produced the following recommendations: 
1. It is recommended that the planners of development 
projects to be undertaken in LDC's become fully 
aware of the many interrelated dimensions of their 
programs. 
2. It is recommended that the persons responsible for 
the implementation of development projects in LDC's 
become fully aware of the interdisciplinary aspects 
of their project. 
3. It is recommended that an interdisciplinary method­
ology be utilized in the analysis of LDC development 
projects. 
4. It is recommended that other LDC development proj­
ects be analyzed using Bordenave's revised set of 
interdisciplinary questions to verify the methodology 
of this study. 
5. It is recommended that other interdisciplinary 
methodologies be used to analyze the two Pakistani 
Rural Development Projects selected for this study, 
and that the findings and conclusions from that 
study be compared with the findings and conclusions 
of this study. 
6. It is recommended that further attempts be made to 
integrate the many components to the development 
problem into a scientific assessment model. 
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APPENDIX 
ORIGINAL FORM OF QUESTIONS USED IN 
INTERDISCIPLINARY ANALYSIS OF CASE STUDIES 
I. Questions as cited in Bordenave, D, "Communication of 
agricultural innovations in Latin America: The need for 
new models." Communication Research. 1976, 3, 135-154. 
1. How autonomous or independent is the country from 
external forces which affect its economy and its 
political decisions? 
2. How is the rural social structure organized, and what 
influence does it exert over individual decision­
making? What is the historical genesis of this 
situation? 
3. Do the majority of the farmers own their land, either 
individually or cooperatively? Do they own their 
agricultural tools? 
4. Who controls the economic institutions, particularly 
the market, credit, and input supply organizations? 
5. Who decides what kinds of innovations should be 
diffused and developed? 
6. Are the farmers consulted and are their needs for 
innovation ascertained? 
7. What criteria are used to guide the choice of innova­
tions for diffusion - (a) the common welfare, (b) the 
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increase of production for export, (c) the maintenance 
of low prices for urban consumers, (d) the profit of 
big commercial farmers and landowners? 
8. What effects will the adoption of certain innova­
tions be likely to have on individual and family 
welfare? On regional and national development in the 
short, medium, and long range? Will they promote 
employment or unemployment, fixation of the rural 
population or migration to the cities, enrichment of 
the already rich or better income distribution? 
9. Do the innovations take into account regional and 
local differences in ecology, economy, farming 
habits, and cultural norms? 
10. Is there any degree of coercion necessary for the 
adoption of an innovation, either by the market situa­
tion, the credit institutions, the government, the 
landlords? 
11. What is the role of mass media advertising? Is it 
persuading farmers to adopt innovations that they 
really need or that they do not need? 
12. How appropriate and well-proven are the products and 
techniques being diffused? Are they adequate to the 
stage of technological, economic, and social develop­
ment in the nation? 
13. What kind of living and learning adjustments do the 
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innovations require from the farmers? Do they re­
quire the establishment of new systems of credit, 
land tenure, technical assistance, marketing, and 
insurance? 
14. Who controls the sources and channels of communication 
for the innovations? Is there communication monopoly, 
censorship, blockage, or distortion? 
15. How adequate are the communication channels' content 
and treatment of the innovation in relation to the 
needs of the farmers? Are they at the service of all 
the farmers or mainly at the service of the govern­
ment, the input industries, the buyers of farm pro­
ducts, the larger farmers, the consumer groups? 
16. What are the feedback possibilities and channels for 
the farmers to communicate their needs and results to 
the innovation sources and policy-makers? 
17. Are farmers organized in pressure groups that can 
exert influence on the social structure of land 
tenure, on the production infrastructure, and on the 
marketing system so as to facilitate the diffusion 
of appropriate innovations? 
18. How adequate are the change agents or extension 
service personnel as a two-way communication channel? 
Are they technically competent, ideologically oriented 
to the welfare of the farmers, methodologically ade­
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quate? 
19. Which are the institutions that directly or in­
directly transfer technology to the farmers? What 
are the present relationships between the processes 
of [human development], formal education, organiza­
tion, politization, and technification of the rural 
population? 
20. Is technification promoted and executed without 
efforts for simultaneous [human development]? 
21. How do farmers diagnose and solve their problems? 
How do they search for extracommunity resources and 
help? How well developed is their communication 
ability? What are the personal and group roles in 
farmers' problem-solving? 
Questions as cited in Hill, P. "Diffusion of Innovation 
qua Transfer of Technology Critique, Comments, and Re­
commendations." Unpublished casual paper, Journalism 
Department, Iowa State University, 1976. 
22. What auxiliary technologies are needed to render the 
use of the proposed technology viable? From whom 
will they be obtained, an external or an internal 
source? What . . . conditions could affect the 
continued availability of these auxiliary technolo­
gies? Are the skills necessary for their maintenance 
available? 
